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ABSTRACT
Since their realization that United Airlines Flight 93 was headed
toward the U.S. Capitol on the morning of September 11, 2001,
legislators and policymakers have been debating how the legislative
branch would continue functioning in the aftermath of a terrorist
attack that killed or incapacitated large numbers of sehators or
representatives. This Article reviews the current House and Senate
"Continuity of Congress"plans, and argues they are both practically
and constitutionally inadequate. Focusing particularly on the
Constitution's majority quorum requirement in Article I, Section
Five, Clause One, this Article argues that a House or Senate
operating in accordance with the current rules of those two bodies
after a catastrophic attack would lack the basic constitutional
structure to do business. The problem would be especially intractable
in the House of Representatives, because seats in that chamber can
only be replenished through elections. Because the rule-making
power granted to the legislative branch in Article I, Section Five,
Clause Two is insufficient to fix this twenty-first century problem,
this Article endorses a constitutional amendment that would
establish an orderly postdisaster replenishment process.
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INTRODUCTION
Since their realization that on the morning of September 11,
2001, United Airlines Flight 93 was headed toward downtown
Washington, D.C., with the objective of destroying the Capitol
building,' congressional leaders and outside policymakers have been
asking how the federal government would have continued operating
if the Flight 93 hijackers had successfully completed their mission.'
Although the legislative branch has a long tradition of grappling
with so-called "Continuity of Congress" issues, the near-miss of
September 11th created a new sense of urgency both inside and
outside Congress to develop emergency procedures that would
minimize the disruption a successful attack would have on legisla-
tive branch operations.
In the course of this process, Congress has been forced to consider
its own mortality and ask difficult questions: How would the
legislative branch reconstitute itself if an enemy managed to kill or
temporarily incapacitate a large number of senators or representa-
tives? In the wake of a catastrophic attack, could the federal
government operate temporarily without a legislative branch? Or,
could Congress temporarily operate with a number of senators and
representatives radically smaller than the full membership of the
two chambers?3
A quick review of Congress's actions in the weeks after the 9/11
attacks illustrates the importance of an operating legislative branch
in the aftermath of a national disaster. Within a week following
9/11, Congress appropriated $40 billion to begin the recovery effort
1. See CONTINUITY OF GOV'T COMM'N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY
OF CONGRESS 34 (2003) [hereinafter CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT]; Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 14 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Symposium on Ensuring the Continuity of Government in Times of Crisis, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 943 (2004) (discussing the way in which "the United States Government can
continue to function in the event of a catastrophic attack").
3. The size of the Senate is determined by the constitutional provision that the Senate
is composed of "two Senators from each State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Since the
reapportionment following the 1910 Census, the House of Representatives has consisted of
435 seats. 2 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 897 (5th ed. 1999). The current
House reapportionment statutes are 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a-2c (2000).
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in New York City,4 and authorized the President to use force against
the terrorists responsible for the attacks.5 Over the next several
months, Congress passed a major revision of federal criminal and
intelligence laws, the USA PATRIOT Act,6 and created a new
federal agency for airport security, the Transportation Security
Administration.7
Questions about how our government would operate in the
aftermath of an attack against Congress that resulted in mass
casualties have inevitably led lawmakers and other debate partici-
pants back to Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which created the
legislative branch and established the basic procedural framework
the House and Senate must follow in order to legitimately meet and
legislate. This debate poses a very basic constitutional question:
what are the essential elements of the legislative branch and its
operations, without which it ceases to be able to act as a legitimate
branch of the federal government?
This question is especially complicated and important for the
House of Representatives, the chamber the Framers considered the
"first branch" of the national legislature,' because of its role as the
most purely representational part of the federal government.
Whereas the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution provides
a process through which states can temporarily fill the seats of
senators killed in a terrorist attack,9 the Constitution requires the
House to replenish its seats through elections, ° which means that
chamber would need weeks or even months to replenish its member-
ship. The difficult challenge for disaster planners seeking a
workable, constitutionally sound postcatastrophe strategy is to
4. 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response
to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220.
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
6. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
7. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
8. E.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 196 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION].
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Before it was superseded by the Seventeenth Amendment,
Article I, Section 3 contained a similar Senate temporary replenishment provision. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4.
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develop a plan that meets two indispensable criteria: (1) that the
legislative branch be able to recover quickly and operate effectively
in the aftermath of an attack, and (2) that the organic structure of
the legislative branch, as spelled out in Article I of the Constitution,
be preserved.
To set up the important questions this Article will explore, it is
worth briefly describing what would happen to the legislative
branch in the case of a mass disaster, according to the disaster plan
that is in force today. If a hijacked airplane like Flight 93 struck the
Capitol at a time when the House and Senate were in session and
killed the majority of the members of those two chambers, several
different rules and statutes would be triggered. In the Senate, the
seats of the dead senators would be declared vacant and the various
state processes allowing governors to name temporary Senate
appointments would be engaged, as is permitted under the Seven-
teenth Amendment." During the days or weeks the states would
take to name temporary appointments to their vacant seats, under
current Senate Rules, the Senate would consist of the smaller
number of the "chosen and sworn" senators who survived the
attack. 2 In the House, which has no constitutional power to
replenish its membership through temporary appointments, the
mass casualty of members would trigger an expedited election law
requiring states to fill these vacancies with elected representatives
within forty-nine days. 3 During the seven weeks necessary to
conduct these special elections, the House would consist of the
"chosen, sworn, and living" members who had survived the attack.14
Another version of this disaster scenario is the even more
problematic "incapacitation" scenario. What would happen if a
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. Other than Alaska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, all states have
adopted statutes allowing their governors to appoint temporary senators. NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS GOVERNING VACANCIES IN THE U.S. SENATE (2005).
Senate rules allow states to present three different sets of credentials: one for senators elected
to six-year terms, one for senators elected to fill out six-year terms, and one for temporary
Senate appointments. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-15 (2000), Rule II,
available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt.
12. S. DOC. No. 106-15, Rule VI.
13. 2 U.S.C.A. § 8(b)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
14. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 109TH CONG., Rule XX, cl. 5(c) (2005)
[hereinafter HOUSE RULES], available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/109_house_
rules_text.htm.
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terrorist attack did not kill a large number of legislators, but
instead injured them severely enough (for example, through an
anthrax attack) that they could not perform their legislative duties
for a long period of time? In this case, there would not be large
numbers of vacant seats, but rather large numbers of living
members who could not appear in the House and Senate chambers
to perform their legislative duties." In the House, under a rule
adopted at the beginning of the 109th Congress, the Speaker would
have the power to determine which members were incapacitated
and then the House could conduct business with the smaller
"provisional" number of members the Speaker judged capable of
fulfilling their duties. 6 The Senate currently has no plan to respond
to the incapacitation scenario. As Senator John Cornyn of Texas
commented in a 2003 hearing, "[i]f 50 Senators were in the hospital,
unable [either] to perform their duties, or resign, they could not be
replaced. The Senate could be unable to operate for up to two full
election cycles-a 4-year period."'7
This Article argues that the plans described above, especially the
plan for the House of Representatives, fail to provide for the
continuity of Congress in a way that preserves the essential
constitutional elements of the legislative branch. This Article will
show that the two chambers' disaster plans both overstep their
constitutional rule-making powers and fail to observe the basic
representative structure of the legislative branch that the Constitu-
tion requires. A greatly diminished House or Senate operating
under their current continuity procedures would not be a valid
legislative branch as the Framers established it in Article I of the
Constitution. The focus of this Article will be one of the key
constitutional procedural provisions the current continuity plans
most obviously violate: the Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 require-
ment that "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to
do Business."'8
15. CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
16. HOUSE RULES, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 5(c).
17. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government: The Congress: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) [hereinafter Senate Continuity
Hearing], available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/108hrg/96926.pdf
(statement of Sen. John Cornyn).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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After examining the role quorum requirements play in the
governance of representative bodies such as the House and the
Senate in Part I, the second Part of this Article examines the
Framers' choice to establish a constitutionally fixed quorum
requirement for the federal legislature. To ensure that a small,
unrepresentative group of legislators would never be able to make
decisions binding on the entire nation, the Framers decided that to
do business, the House and the Senate required the presence of
representatives from a majority of the whole number of seats in
those two bodies. For the purpose of determining a quorum to do
business, the practice of the First through Thirty-sixth Congresses
was to define the whole number of seats in the House and Senate as
all seats authorized by the Constitution and later statutes, whether
filled or vacant at a given time.
Part III examines how, during the political stress of the Civil War
period, the House and Senate violated the clear meaning and the
original understanding of the Quorum Clause by redefining the
House and the Senate to mean the variable number of people
elected to those two bodies at any one time. It traces how, relying on
the rule-making power they are given in Article I, Section 5, Clause
2, the House and the Senate have followed this variable quorum
principle to the current day. Part IV examines the two bodies'
extensive power to determine the rules of their proceedings, but
explains why this power does not extend to altering the majority
quorum rule.
Finally, Part V explains how an esoteric argument over the
meaning of the Quorum Clause would become a gravely serious
issue in the case of a catastrophic event that radically reduced the
numbers of the two houses, either through death or incapacitation
of their members. In particular, a numerically small House of
Representatives would not meet the most basic requirements of the
representative body created in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion, and would thereby expose a Congress acting after a disaster to
serious charges of illegitimacy.
This Article concludes that the continuity options permitted
under Article I of the Constitution do not allow the House and the
Senate to respond properly to a 9/11-type disaster, and should be
amended to allow those two bodies to develop new procedures to
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replenish quickly their numbers in the wake of a calamitous attack.
Support for a constitutional amendment to fix this problem requires
a simple acknowledgement that the threats that our government
faces today are different from those the Framers could have
contemplated in 1787. A House and Senate whose numbers are
quickly replenished through an orderly, constitutionally determined
process would have more legitimacy and a greater ability to act
decisively than a numerically small, unrepresentative House and
Senate.
I. THE ROLE OF QUORUM REQUIREMENTS IN THE GOVERNANCE OF
REPRESENTATIVE BODIES
The purpose of a quorum requirement in any corporate body, from
a board of directors to a state or federal legislature, is to ensure that
a certain number of members are present before a body can transact
business. Quorum rules address one of the most basic questions in
corporate governance: under what conditions can a governing body
meet and make decisions that are binding on the entire corporate
entity? A quorum requirement determines when a group is
"sufficiently represented at a meeting that its members present can
speak for its entire membership."19 A group of members of a
corporate board or a legislature smaller than the required quorum
has no power to act for the corporate entity. The moment its number
reaches the quorum level, however, the group has the power to
make decisions and take actions that are binding on the entire body.
A modern social scientist looks at the quorum issue as a probabil-
ity problem. If all members of a governing board or body are
present, a condition we will call N, they can vote, either under a
majority wins or another rule, and the probability is one hundred
percent that they will reach the "correct decision," the decision that
represents the board's collective position on an issue. But if one or
more members are absent (N-1, N-2, etc.) from a meeting at which
the board or legislative body is doing business, the probability it will
reach the "correct decision" begins to drop below one hundred
percent and the possibility arises that the group will reach a
19. MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE § 49 (rev. ed. 2000) [hereinafter
MASON'S MANUAL].
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decision that is a "false negative" or a "false positive." The purpose
of a quorum requirement is to ensure that the probability the body
will reach a "correct decision" will never drop below a certain level.
The quorum number represents a floor, below which the probability
of an incorrect decision is too high for the organization to tolerate.2 °
Quorum rules therefore reflect a corporate entity's concerns about
how its governing body makes decisions. On the one hand, an entity
would like its decision-making body to take actions that generate
wide support throughout the entity. On the other hand, the costs of
assembling the entire decision-making body and then getting that
body to reach unanimous or almost-unanimous decisions can
sometimes be prohibitive. Quorum rules strike a balance between
the costs of decision making and the desirability of taking actions
that the entity will accept as legitimate.
By far the most common practice in both the legislative and
corporate spheres is to allow a body to act when a majority of its
members are present. To a social scientist, a majority quorum
requirement (N/2 rounded up when N is odd, and N/2 + 1 when N
is even) is simply one of many points on a decision-making probabil-
ity curve.2' But the majority quorum requirement has a special
value because it represents the lowest point to which the quorum
number can drop while preserving the principle of majority decision
making. Setting the quorum requirement at N/2 + 1 means that a
20. Statisticians and behavioral psychologists have pointed out, however, that the quorum
probability function is actually a "sawtoothed function," meaning the probability of a correct
answer does not increase smoothly the closer the number gets to N. Dan S. Felsenthal,
Averting the Quorum Paradox, 36 BEHAV. SCI. 57, 60 (1991). The probability drops and climbs
according to whether N -x is an odd number or an even number; for example, for a majority
of eight, you need five votes, the same number you need for a majority of nine. This
phenomenon leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that the probability the House of
Representatives will reach a "correct decision" when 433 Members are present is higher
(0.749) than when 434 members are present (0.498). Id.
21. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 81-82 (1999). These authors note that
[tihe (N/2 + 1) point seems, a priori, to represent nothing more than one among
the many possible rules, and it would seem very improbable that this rule
should be "ideally" chosen for more than a very limited set of collective activities.
On balance, 51 per cent of the voting population would not seem to be much
preferable to 49 per cent.
Id. at 82.
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majority of the members of the governing body will have to be
present before it can conduct business, which provides a guarantee
to the broader entity that a minority group is not making decisions
for the majority. As Luther Cushing, the famous nineteenth century
parliamentary expert, explained it, quorum requirements "prevent
matters from being concluded in a hasty manner, or agreed to by so
small a number of the members, as not to command a due and
proper respect. 22
The parliamentary principle that a majority empowers a body to
take actions binding on the whole entity is one practical application
of a basic principle of liberal Western political thought-that
governments formed through the consent of the people can take
actions with the consent of a majority. The most famous statement
of this principle is Locke's discussion of majority rule in Chapter
VIII of the Second Treatise on Government. When men have
consented to form a community and a "body politic," Locke argues,
they also consent to be governed by a majority of that body.23 The
heart of this argument is the very practical observation that if a
community cannot move "whither the greater force carries it," it
cannot effectively act as one body and will quickly dissolve.24 As
support for this argument, Locke cited the practice of legislative
assemblies:
[WIe see that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws,
where no number is set by that positive law which empowers
them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and
of course determines; as having, by the law of nature and reason,
the power of the whole. 5
Locke argued that a society would collapse under its own weight if
it required the consent of each member to take action: it is logisti-
cally difficult to get every member of a body in one place at the same
time; and even if you could get every member of the body together
22. LUTHER S. CUSHING, RULES OF PROCEEDING ANDDEBATE INDELIBERATIVEASSEMBLIES
27 (5th ed. 1899).
23. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 142 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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in the same room, their "variety of opinions" and "contrariety of
interests" would make it impossible to reach a unanimous decision.26
Although later political theorists have expressed concern about the
rights of the minority members in Locke's community who must
submit to the "greater force" of the majority, majoritarian decision
making strikes a compromise between social utility and individual
consent, and remains a workable and equitable solution to a basic
problem of representative government.2 v
Whereas the traditional rule, as well as the rule in all modern
state corporation statutes, is that a majority of directors constitutes
a quorum for an official meeting, modern corporation laws allow
entities to set quorum requirements that are higher or lower than
a majority.28 The current U.S. model corporation law allows entities
to have quorum requirements as low as one-third of board member-
ship, and allows supermajority requirements as high as one
hundred percent of board membership.2" In modern U.S. legislative
procedure, majority quorum requirements are the general rule,
although a few states require the presence of two-thirds of their
members to constitute a quorum. 30
A supermajority requirement, such as a two-thirds quorum
rule or a two-thirds voting rule, shows that the entity puts a
priority on high levels of participation and agreement in its decision
making, even if it increases the costs of the process and the
possibility that the process could deadlock. In the corporate context,
for example, the comments to the Model Business Code note that
higher-than-majority vote or quorum requirements are most
commonly used in closely held corporations, "where a greater degree
of participation is thought appropriate or where a minority partici-
pant in the venture seeks to obtain a veto power over corporate
26. Id. at 143.
27. See Douglas W. Rae, The Limits of Consensual Decision, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1270
(1975), for a discussion of how recalcitrant minorities, private actions, and other factors
undermine arguments that consensual decision making can be more socially efficient than
majority decision making.
28. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.24 (3d ed. & historical background Supp. 2005).
29. See id.
30. See MASON'S MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 19, § 500. The states
with supermajority quorum requirements are Indiana, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. NAT'L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, QUORUM REQUIREMENTS (2003).
20061 1035
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
action."'" Lower-than-majority quorum requirements, on the other
hand, reflect a corporate entity's concern for the efficiency of the
decision-making process and less concern about thorough participa-
tion in that process. The comments to the Model Business Code note
that Delaware and other states permit quorum numbers as low as
one-third because they appear to provide "useful flexibility primar-
ily for publicly held corporations with large boards of directors." 2
In the legislative setting a supermajority quorum requirement
means that participation in the decision-making process will be
higher, but it also provides minorities a tool they do not have under
a majority quorum rule: the power to block majority action by
simply not showing up. The power of a large, cohesive minority to
"bust the quorum" means that a minority group has an option other
than staying in a chamber and fighting the majority's legislative
proposals through debate and amendment. It has the additional
option of blocking legislation by depriving the chamber of its ability
to conduct business. In May 2003, for example, a group of fifty-three
Texas Democratic state representatives known as the "Killer Ds,"
who opposed a Republican redistricting bill, seceded from the 150-
seat chamber and thereby deprived the Texas House of the two-
thirds quorum the state's constitution requires for the chamber to
do business.3 3 An earlier quorum-busting episode in Texas history
reflected intraparty rather than interparty tensions. In 1979, a
group of twelve Democratic state senators, known as the "Killer
Bees," seceded from the thirty-three-seat house to deprive it of the
two-thirds quorum necessary to consider a Democratic proposal to
change primary dates in a way that would have assisted the 1980
presidential candidacy of former Texas Governor John Connally. 4
31. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.24 official cmt.
32. Id. § 8.24 historical background.
33. TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 10 ("Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of
absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide."). In
order to prevent the House Speaker from compelling them to return to the House chamber,
these quorum-busting legislators escaped to Ardmore, Oklahoma, outside the jurisdiction of
Texas authorities. R.G. Ratcliffe et al., Wanted: AWOL Democrats; Some Rebel Lawmakers
Surface in Oklahoma, HOUSTON CHRON., May 13, 2003, at Al.
34. Dennis A. Williams & Lea Donosky, The Bees that Had Texas in a Buzz, NEWSWEEK,
June 4, 1979, at 29.
1036 [Vol. 48:1025
HOW TO SURVIVE A TERRORIST ATTACK
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S MAJORITY QUORUM
REQUIREMENT
The basic advantages and disadvantages of different quorum and
voting requirements were just as apparent to eighteenth century
politicians as they are to their twenty-first century counterparts.
Many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 were
experienced legislators with practical knowledge of the effects of
different quorum rules on representative assemblies' decision-
making process. The debate conducted on the quorum requirement,
which ultimately resulted in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, reflected
their legislative experiences and considered opinion about where the
federal legislature's quorum requirements should fall in the
continuum between high and low representative participation. The
conclusion of this debate was that, in order to ensure the represen-
tative nature of the two legislative chambers, the House and the
Senate should be structured on a majoritarian principle.
A. The Debate and Rejection of a Submajority Quorum Rule
The question of where to set the quorum requirement in the new
federal legislature was not the most contentious issue of the 1787
Constitutional Convention. But it is clear from the record of debates
that the Convention considered several alternatives to the majority
quorum requirement ultimately included in Article I, Section 5,
Clause 1. When the Committee on Details reported back to the
Convention on August 6th with a draft based on the Convention's
earlier debates, it included a section in Article VI establishing that
a majority of members of each House constituted a quorum to do
business.35 The Convention had not debated the issue before this
time, so it appears that the members of the Committee on Detail, as
they did in other sections, took this language from contemporary
35. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 180 (1911). The text of this section read: "In
each House a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day." Id.
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state constitutions. 6 Working its way through the Committee's
draft, the Convention arrived at this section on August 10th.
One of the central themes of the debate over the quorum require-
ment concerned the logistical difficulties and delays contemporary
legislatures had in assembling a majority of their members. Many
delegates feared that a high quorum requirement in a national
legislature would be an insurmountable obstacle to the efficient
conduct of business. While House and Senate members from
centrally located states could reach the meeting place within a few
days, members from states farther north and south sometimes
needed weeks to reach the seat of government.37 Nathaniel
Gorham, who came from the one state, Massachusetts, with a
numerically fixed, submajority quorum requirement, 8 argued that,
if the Congress needed a majority to act, "great delay might happen
in business."39 Part of his argument was that the logistical problems
would just grow more acute over time as the population and
geographical extent of the United States grew and the number of
representatives needed to constitute a majority quorum continued
to grow.4 ° Another Massachusetts delegate, Rufus King, argued that
36. By the time of the 1787 Convention, the legislative bodies of the thirteen states
generally operated under majority quorum requirements. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE
PROCEDURE 27-29 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1922). During debate on the presidential veto on
August 15, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts expressed his feeling that "a majority [was]
as large a quorum as was necessary. It was the quorum almost every where fixt in the U.
States." 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 300. Several years earlier, Thomas Jefferson
had noted that the Virginia assembly followed the lex majoris partis, which was "founded in
common law as well as common right. It is the natural law of every assembly of men, whose
numbers are not fixed by any other law." THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia,
in WRITINGS 251 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1781-82).
37. For example, at the opening of the Constitutional Convention on May 14, 1787, only
two complete state delegations, from Virginia and Pennsylvania, were present. CHARLES
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 101-02 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1928).
The Convention was only able to convene for business eleven days later, on May 25th, when
the seventh state delegation, from New Jersey, arrived in Philadelphia. Id. at 120.
38. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 set a quorum of sixteen for the state senate
and a quorum of sixty for the state house of representatives. 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 99, 100 (William F. Swindler ed., 1975). In the Massachusetts
General Court of 1787-88, there were thirty-six elected senators and 272 elected
representatives, which meant the numerical quorum requirements for both houses were below
a majority. During an 1862 debate in the United States Senate on the quorum requirement,
Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner alluded to this Massachusetts "exception." CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (1862).
39. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 251.
40. Id.
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the "future increase of members would render a majority of the
whole extremely cumbersome." '41
The proponents of a lower quorum requirement made another
argument: that a majority quorum requirement might be high
enough to encourage members of Congress to engage in quorum-
busting maneuvers (what they called "secessions"). Their argument
was that if a house had once reached a majority to do business, but
many members were still absent, a minority group large enough to
deprive the house of a majority could hold the Congress hostage by
threatening secession." Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania invoked
the ominous scenario that "if a few can break up a quorum, they
may seize a moment when a particular [part] of the Continent may
be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession,
some unjust & selfish measure. 43 John Mercer of Maryland agreed
that a majority quorum requirement was high enough to tempt
representatives to secede, and pointed out that the English Houses
of Parliament had set their quorum requirements at numbers
significantly below a majority. Mercer "was for leaving it to the
Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the
requisite number is small & no inconveniency has been experi-
enced."44
In response to these concerns over the high potential costs of a
majority requirement, several delegates proposed setting a baseline
quorum number in the Constitution, but then giving the houses
discretion to later adjust the quorum number through legislation.
41. Id. at 253.
42. This scenario describes what actually happened in the Thirty-seventh Congress when
eleven southern states did not send legislators to Washington. See infra Part III.
43. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 252 (alteration in original).
44. Id. at 251. Story noted that the current quorum to do business in the English House
of Commons (a body of almost six hundred members) was forty-five. 3 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 296 (Carolina Academic Press
1987) (1833). In a debate over the quorum requirement in the Thirty-eighth Congress, Senator
Reverdy Johnson pointed to the low quorum requirements in Parliament to show that small
quorum numbers presented "no great inconvenience" to that body's ability to do business.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2086 (1864). English parliamentary practice still has
extremely low quorum requirements. In the House of Lords, which had a full membership of
710 in 1976, a quorum was present if only three Lords were in attendance. ERSKINE MAYS
TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 292 (19th ed.
1976). In the case of votes, thirty Lords had to be present. Id. A quorum in the House of
Commons was forty members, in a body whose full membership was 659. Id. at 301.
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Rufus King proposed setting the quorum number at thirty-three for
the House and fourteen for the Senate, majorities of the two
chambers as they were being created in the proposed Constitution,
and then allowing future Congresses to increase those numbers.45
In other words, the Constitution would set a quorum number that
would be a majority in the First Congress, but would be less than a
majority in future Congresses as the chambers grew in size. This
proposal fixed a minimum numerical quorum requirement, but it
left future Congresses with the discretion to adjust, or not adjust,
that number in accordance with future circumstances. For example,
if the House of Representatives grew to a ninety-eight-member
chamber and experienced the logistical problems some delegates
were predicting, the House might choose to keep the quorum
number at thirty-three, which would be a one-third quorum
requirement. 6
The majority of delegates, however, favored a constitutionally
fixed majority quorum requirement, arguing that, in spite of the
higher costs it imposed on the decision-making process, it provided
Americans a guarantee that a small group of unrepresentative
people could not take actions binding the whole country.47 In what
appears to have been a lengthy floor statement, George Mason of
Virginia argued that in a country so large and diverse as the United
States, it "would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small
number of members ... to make laws," because members from the
central states could get to the Congress more easily and pass laws
without waiting for those members who had to travel greater
distances. 48 Leaving the power to determine the quorum require-
ment in the hands of the legislature itself also invited mischief by
allowing a small group of legislators the power to lower the quorum
45. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 252-53. The text of Kings amendment
provided that
not less than 33 members of the House of representatives, nor less that 14
members of the Senate, shall constitute a quorum to do business; a smaller
number in either House may adjourn from day to day, but the number necessary
to form such quorum may be encreased by an act of the Legislature on the
addition of members in either branch.
Id. at 245.
46. As Daniel Carroll of Maryland noted, this amendment provided "no security agst. a
continuance of the quorums at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased." Id. at 253.
47. Id. at 251-52.
48. Id.
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and rule the country by "Juncto."4 9 On the secession issue, Mason
related that his own experience in the Virginia assembly was that
the threat of secession sometimes forced legislators to reach
agreements out of apprehension of losing a quorum to do business.50
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut supported the majority quorum
requirement and opposed King's proposal, saying "[i]t would be a
pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no law or burden
could be imposed on them, by a few men."5' Addressing the fear of
quorum-busting, Ellsworth pointed out that "[t]he inconveniency of
secessions may be guarded agst by giving to each House an
authority to require the attendance of absent members."52
The Convention demonstrated its opposition to dropping the
quorum requirement to less than a majority of the body by voting
down King's amendment by a vote of nine to two5" and adopting the
majority quorum requirement by voice vote, after Randolph and
Madison added language giving the houses the power to compel
members to attend sessions when a quorum was lacking.54 This
section became Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution, as
the Committee on Style reported it on September 12, 1787."5
B. The Debate and Rejection of a Supermajority Quorum Rule
The Constitution's authors expressed their support for a majority
requirement in another way as well: by opposing supermajority
requirements in all but a few special cases.56 During the Constitu-
tional Convention and the ratification conventions, some delegates
objected that a simple majority requirement was not high enough to
protect American citizens from bad or hasty legislation. During
49. Id. at 252. In the later eighteenth century, the term "Juncto," or "Junto," had a precise
political meaning. It referred to a small group within a legislature that managed to wrest
control of the administration of the state's government from the royally appointed executive.
It was a term often used in combination with the similarly derisive term "faction." See RALPH
VOLNEY HARLow, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825, at 49-
60 (1917).
50. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 251-52.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 253-54.
55. Id. at 592.
56. See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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debate over presidential veto power on August 15, 1787, Daniel
Carroll of Maryland argued that the majority quorum requirement
made it more important to have a strong executive negative power,
because as few as seventeen representatives and eight Senators
could take advantage of the majority quorum requirement and pass
"improper laws."57 The argument that the small size of the two
houses, combined with the majority quorum requirement, empow-
ered unrepresentative small groups to impose unfair laws on the
people, featured prominently in Anti-Federalist criticisms of the
Constitution. During the New York Convention, for example, the
Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith used the small numbers needed
to pass legislation to explain his belief that the proposed federal
legislature would not "wear the complexion of a democratic
branch."58 He explained:
The whole number, in both houses, amounts to ninety-one; of
these forty-six make a quorum; and twenty-four of those, being
secured, may carry any point. Can the liberties of three millions
of people be securely trusted in the hands of twenty-four men?
Is it prudent to commit to so small a number the decision of the
great questions which will come before them? Reason revolts at
the idea. 9
The response to these so-called "attenuated democracy" criti-
cisms-that a simple majority quorum requirement would not be
enough to protect citizens against bad laws-was that supermajority
requirements actually had the effect of empowering a different kind
of "juncto," a small group of dissidents who could stymie a majority
by depriving the house of a quorum. Madison and Hamilton both
dedicated time to defending the size of the national legislature and
to criticizing supermajority quorum requirements in the Federalist
57. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 300.
58. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 249 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888)
[hereinafter STATE CONVENTIONS].
59. Id. The widespread concern over the size of the federal legislature prompted the First
Congress to ratify a constitutional amendment guaranteeing that the size of the houses would
increase with the population. This original First Amendment to the Bill of Rights, however,
fell short by one state for ratification. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1137-43 (1991).
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Papers. In Federalist No. 58, Madison conceded that a supermajority
quorum requirement might serve as "an additional shield to some
particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and
partial measures."' But he argued that the disadvantages of a two-
thirds rule were greater than the advantages: if Congress required
a two-thirds majority to do business, one-third of the Congress could
effectively stymie the will of the other two-thirds through "the
baneful practice of secessions," by depriving the legislature of its
ability to do business.6' A simple majority requirement, Madison
argued, encourages a minority to stay in the chamber and work to
improve legislation. It diminishes a minority's ability to extort
concessions from the majority to pass the majority's legislation.62
In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton bitterly attacked the legislative
supermajority rules created by the Articles of Confederation. Having
experienced such supermajority requirements first-hand as a New
York representative in the Continental Congress, Hamilton wrote:
"To give a minority a negative [i.e., veto] upon the majority (which
is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision) is in its tendency to subject the sense of the greater
number to that of the lesser number."63 Making this same point in
a different way during the New York ratifying convention, Hamilton
argued that under a majoritarian scheme, "corruption must embrace
a majority," while under a supermajoritarian system, corruption's
"poison, administered to a single man, may render the efforts of a
majority totally vain."'
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 286 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
61. Id. at 286-87.
62. Id. at 286. In a letter to Edward Everett in 1830, Madison opposed the so-called
"Nullification Doctrine" (usually associated with Senator John Calhoun), which provided that
a state could declare a federal law unconstitutional unless three-fourths of the states overrode
this finding. Madison wrote: "But to establish a positive and permanent rule giving such a
power, to such a minority, over such a majority, would overturn the first principle of free
government, and in practice necessarily overturn the government itself." JAMES MADISON,
Opposition to Nullification, in THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIc WRITINGS 158 (Saul
Padover ed., 1953).
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(alteration in original).
64. 2 STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 58, at 264. Madison employed this "a minority is
easier to corrupt" argument during a late August debate in the Convention over Charles
Pinckney's proposal, offered on behalf of the southern states, that all laws regulating
international commerce require two-thirds votes to pass. Madison observed "that the power
of foreign nations to obstruct our retaliating measures on them by a corrupt influence would
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When writing the Federalist Papers, Madison and Hamilton
would have had a quorum-busting episode fresh in their minds:
the legislative secession that had occurred in the Pennsylvania
Assembly about a month after the close of the Constitutional
Convention, an event that threatened to derail the ratification
process. On September 28, 1787, by a vote of forty-three to nineteen,
the Assembly passed a resolution calling for a state convention to
consider the proposed Constitution.65 When the Speaker tried to
reconvene the house later in the day to pass legislation providing for
the election of delegates to the Convention, he found a quorum was
lacking because a group of western members who opposed the new
Constitution had refused to return to the chamber. Because the full
membership of the Assembly was sixty-eight and the state's
constitution had a two-thirds quorum requirement, the present
forty-four members were two short of a quorum to do business.66 The
members present in the chamber were outraged and expressed their
regret that "our Journals are again to be stained by recording the
conduct of an unmanly minority."67 The next morning, a mob went
to Major Boyd's Tavern and "forcibly dragged" two of the absent
legislators, James M'Calmont and Jacob Miley, "through the streets
of Philadelphia to the State House, and there detained [them] by
force, and in the presence of the majority, who had, the day before,
voted for the first of the proposed resolutions, treated [them] with
the most insulting language."" With these two, forty-six members
were present in the chamber; the Assembly had a quorum to do
business, and it quickly passed the resolution. 9
As this review of the historical evidence makes clear, the authors
of the Constitution created a legislative branch that generally
operated on a "bare majority" principle: when a majority of each
house's members were present, a simple majority vote was enough
to pass legislation.70 As Justice Story remarked in his commentary,
also be less if a majority shd be made competent than if 2/3 of each House shd. be required to
legislative acts in this case." 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 452.
65. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 94 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976).
66. Id. at 95-96 & nn.1-2.
67. Id. at 98.
68. Id. at 114.
69. Id. at 103- 10.
70. One scholar has explained the relationship between the bare majority requirement
[Vol. 48:10251044
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the Constitution departs from "the general rule, of the right of a
majority to govern," in only a few, special cases.7' The eight
instances in which the Constitution requires supermajorities in the
legislative process were carefully considered exceptions to the rule.
The two-thirds vote requirement to expel members," for example,
came from the feeling that legislators had the right to protect their
personal reputations from ephemeral partisan battles. Madison
offered the amendment requiring this two-thirds vote because "the
right of expulsion ... was too important to be exercised by a bare
majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be
dangerously abused."7 " As discussed above, the two-thirds vote to
override a presidential veto7 4 was the conclusion of a long structural
debate over the roles of the legislative and executive branches in the
lawmaking process and the concern that a simple legislative
majority might pass "improper laws."75 While the Framers decided
that the executive should not have an "absolute negative" over
congressional acts, they also thought Congress should have to
demonstrate a higher degree of support for legislation the President
to pass legislation and a majority quorum requirement:
In general, where the underlying voting rule is enactment by simple majority,
there will be strong pressure to adopt a majority quorum requirement as well.
If a minority cannot defeat an enactment on the merits, the intuition runs, why
should the same minority be able to block an enactment by absenting
themselves and thereby breaking the quorum?
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361,
403 (2004).
71. 3 STORY, supra note 44, at 324. The fact that the Framers envisioned the House and
Senate as majoritarian bodies does not prohibit those two bodies from adopting rules
requiring supermajorities in certain cases, such as the Senate cloture rule or a House rule
requiring a three-fifths vote to increase federal income tax rates, because such rules can be
reversed by a simple majority of those bodies. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 834-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that members of the House do not have standing to bring suit against the
House on the theory that a three-fifths voting requirement dilutes their vote because this
three-fifths requirement can be repealed by a simple majority vote). See generally John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (discussing with approval the three-fifths
tax increase rule).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
73. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 254.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The Article I, Section 7, requirement for a two-thirds vote to
override a presidential veto means two-thirds of the body empowered to act because a quorum
is present, not two-thirds of the body's entire membership. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248
U.S. 276, 284-85 (1919).
75. See supra Part II.B.
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opposed.7" As James Wilson explained this provision during the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, if the President, who represents
the "whole Union" of the United States, rejects a bill the Congress
presents to him, then the Congress should have to meet a higher
burden to enact the bill into law."
C. The Majority Quorum Requirement as a Fixed Constitutional
Rule of Procedure
The Constitutional Convention considered several different
quorum rules, debating in some detail how the different schemes
would affect the representative bodies they sought to create.
Working in an era when the concept of "representative democracy"
was much more controversial than it is today,78 and anticipating
that critics would focus on the small size of the two chambers, the
Convention's decision about where to set the quorum requirement
was politically important.
Accordingly, the convention rejected the English Parliament
model of a numerically small quorum, which would reduce the costs
of doing business, but would not provide what they thought was an
adequate representational guarantee. Under the English model,
Story wrote, "the concerns of the nation might be decided by a very
small number of the members of each body."79 The Constitution's
majority quorum requirement, on the other hand, "has secured the
public from any hazard of passing laws by surprise, or against the
76. As Hamilton explained it, the presidential qualified negative "establishes a salutary
check upon the legislative body calculated to guard the community against the effects of
faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 358 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Terence Ball ed., 2003).
77. 2 STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 58, at 448. Wilson also pointed out that Article I,
Section 7 contained the further procedural guarantee that votes to override presidential
vetoes be recorded in the House and Senate journals. This public disclosure requirement
would serve as a restraint on the legislative branch because people would know exactly which
legislators to blame for a bad law. Id.
78. ROBERTA. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 103-05 (1998).
79. 3 STORY, supra note 44, at 296. As Vermeule, repeating the observation of Jeremy
Bentham, points out, a constraint on minoritarian legislative action is the fact that a majority
in the legislature can simply repeal or amend that action. It is not a perfect restraint,
however, because there might be limitations on reconsideration and because the minoritarian
action becomes the new status quo point, therefore becoming harder to alter. Vermeule, supra
note 70, at 405-06.
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deliberate opinion of a majority of the representative body."' The
majority quorum requirement was an important procedural
assurance that fewer than a majority of representatives or senators,
who could represent only one region or narrow interest of the
American people, could not make decisions binding the whole
nation."' While conceding that a supermajority quorum requirement
would set a higher representational standard than a majority
quorum, the Convention delegates rejected a supermajority quorum
requirement after considering its higher costs and its potential to
empower quorum busters.82
The Convention not only decided that the legislative branch
should operate under a majoritarian regime; it also decided that this
principle was so important that it should be included among the few
fixed procedural rules in Article I of the Constitution. Because they
felt a majority quorum requirement was a fundamental feature of
the legislative branch, the Framers made it an organic, unalterable
element of legislative procedure. 3 After considering several
alternatives, the Framers decided that future Congresses should not
have the ability to alter the quorum requirements because they
would have a strong motivation to do so in favor of their party or
faction.' Once Congress was created and legislators began to meet
and pass laws, they would be tempted to alter quorum requirements
to advance their short-term political goals. The Framers felt they
were in a better position to develop a rule guaranteeing the basic
80. 3 STORY, supra note 44, at 296. A prominent early commentator on the Constitution,
St. George Tucker, described the majority quorum clause as
a provision of no small importance, since otherwise it is possible that the
concerns of the nation might be decided by a very small portion of its
representatives; if as has been done in other assemblies, the quorum were left
to the decision of the body itself. In England, where there are near six hundred
members in the house of commons, the number of 45 constitutes a quorum to do
business. Is it possible that the nation can be represented by that number,
whilst the elections stand upon their present footing?
2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ed. app. at 201-03 (Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803).
81. See supra Part II.A.
82. See supra Part II.B.
83. Vermeule, supra note 70, at 366.
84. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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democratic operations of the two houses than the people who would
operate within the system the Framers were creating.85
In his influential Notes on the State of Virginia, written during
the Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson described a situation that
he thought illustrated why it was a bad idea to give legislatures
the power to alter their quorum requirements. Jefferson explained
that under normal circumstances, the Virginia assembly operated
under a majority quorum requirement, but had recently lowered its
quorum number to forty members in the face of the "present
dangerous invasion."'86 He thought his legislators' actions set a
precedent that could be abused in the future. He explained:
They have been moved to this by the fear of not being able to
collect a house. But this danger could not authorize them to call
that a house which was none: and if they may fix it at one
number, they may at another, till it loses its fundamental
character of being a representative body.... From forty it may be
reduced to four, and from four to one: from a house to a commit-
tee, from a committee to a chairman or speaker, and thus an
oligarchy or monarchy be substituted under forms supposed to
be regular.8 7
It is important to note that August 10, the day the Convention
took up the quorum issue, was also the day it conducted an exten-
sive debate on a fundamental, congressional structural issue that
also produced a constitutionally fixed provision: the qualifications
of members of Congress.' While the Committee of Detail draft
contained sections setting out the qualifications of representatives
and senators, it also contained a section-Article VI, Section
2-stating that the Congress "shall have authority to establish such
uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard
to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient." 9 This
85. Vermeule, supra note 70, at 371.
86. JEFFERSON, supra note 36, at 251.
87. Id. In Federalist No. 48, Madison cited a long passage from the same chapter of
Jefferson's Notes explaining how the legislative branch in the Virginia government had
encroached on the judicial and executive branches of the government. THE FEDERALIST No.
48, at 242-43 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
88. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 533-36 (1969).
89. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 179.
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section provoked a debate not only on the subject of property
qualifications, but also a more general discussion on whether the
legislature should have the ability to add to the basic three qualifi-
cations of age, citizenship, and residence.
One of the most interesting features of this debate was that
delegates on opposite sides of the pro;erty qualification issue agreed
that giving Congress the power to create property qualifications
could produce undesirable outcomes. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina, a supporter of property qualifications, pointed out that if
the first Congress was elected without property qualifications, then
it would set property qualifications at the level most advantageous
to itself.' If the first Congress "should happen to consist of rich men
they might fix such ... qualifications as may be too favorable to the
rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into."'"
Pinckney proposed establishing property qualifications in the
Constitution to avoid this problem.92
Madison's famous speech against this section comprehensively
laid out the question of constitutionalizing rules versus leaving
them up to future Congresses. The qualifications of electors and
elected, Madison said, were 'Tundamental articles in a Republican
Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution."93 Giving legislators
the power to alter the qualifications of people who could hold office
gave them an incentive to devise rules that would favor their faction
and exclude their opponents. Madison's even more basic structural
opposition to the section was that it would create a conflict of
interest between a legislator and his constituents. 94 Rather than
represent their constituents, legislators would devise qualification
rules to entrench themselves in their offices and work for their own
private interests; in this way they would "subvert the Constitution"
and turn the country into an aristocracy or an oligarchy.95 By voting
to strip this section out of the Committee draft, the Convention
reached the same conclusion it reached later that day on the
quorum requirement: it fixed representatives' qualifications in the
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 248-49.
93. Id. at 249-50.
94. Id. at 250.
95. Id. at 249-50.
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Constitution rather than allow the federal legislature to modify
qualifications as it saw fit.96
This debate over the qualifications clause is well known because
it played a major role in the Supreme Court's opinion in Powell v.
McCormack,97 in which the Court ruled that the House of Represen-
tatives unconstitutionally blocked Representative Adam Clayton
Powell from taking his seat in the Ninetieth Congress.9" The people
of the Eighteenth Congressional District of New York had reelected
Powell in spite of the fact that a House subcommittee had deter-
mined that Powell had misused official funds.9" But when the House
refused to swear him in as a member of the Ninetieth Congress, the
Court found the House had exceeded its power because "the
Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the require-
ments for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution."'100
Powell's extensive historical analysis of the qualifications debate
during and after the Constitutional Convention' 01 shows that
Madison's and other delegates' strong feelings on this subject came
from a well-known battle in the English Parliament over the
expulsion and conviction of an elected member, John Wilkes, for
attacking the English Crown's peace agreement with France." 2 Both
the intent of the Framers and the "basic principles of our democratic
system" convinced the Court that Congress did not have the
"discretionary power" to deny a duly-elected member such as
Representative Powell a seat in Congress.' In other words, the
Court concluded in Powell, Congress has no power to alter rules that
the Framers intended to be fixed and unalterable. While the
Constitution gave the two legislative houses almost unlimited power
to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings,"'' 4 it carefully created a
96. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
97. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
98. Id. at 547-48.
99. Id. at 490.
100. Id. at 522.
101. "As this elaborate summary reveals, our historical analysis in Powell was both
detailed and persuasive. We thus conclude ... that history shows that, with respect to
Congress, the Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications." U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 792-93 (1995).
102. Powell, 395 U.S. at 527-31.
103. Id. at 548.
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see infra Part IV.
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small number of constitutionally fixed rules that would remain
beyond the reach of future Congresses.
D. The Majority Quorum Requirement in the Early Congresses
The First Congress's records from early 1789 allow us to see how
the Framers serving in that Congress treated the majority quorum
rule they had debated and drafted in the summer of 1787. It is a
well-settled principle that the way the First Congress applied
constitutional provisions "is contemporaneous and weighty evidence
of its true meaning."1 °5 As Chief Justice Taft explained in Myers v.
United States,0 6 courts owe special deference to the constitutional
constructions of the First Congress, because that legislature con-
tained "a considerable number of those who had been members of
the Convention that framed the Constitution and presented it for
ratification."'0' It is a widely accepted rule, Taft explained, that "a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were
actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term
of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions." '
The opening of the First Session of the House of Representatives
and Senate shows that the First Congress interpreted the Constitu-
tion's majority quorum requirement to mean that to do business, the
houses needed the attendance of a majority of representatives from
the whole number of seats created in the Constitution, a total of
sixty-five House seats and twenty-six Senate seats."°9 In other
words, for the purposes of determining the presence of a quorum,
the Framers defined the "House" and the "Senate" according to their
total number of authorized seats. Because Rhode Island and North
Carolina had not yet ratified the Constitution in March 1789, the
number of apportioned seats in the House was fifty-nine, a majority
of which was thirty members."0 On March 4, 1789, the first day of
105. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,
127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888)).
106. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
107. Id. at 174.
108. Id. at 175.
109. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (House); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1 (Senate).
110. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1826).
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the Congress, only thirteen members appeared in New York. 1 ' The
House Journal noted: "But a quorum of the whole number not being
present, the House adjourned until to-morrow morning eleven
o'clock.""' 2 Over the next several weeks, the journal dutifully
recorded the new members who appeared in the chamber, noting
that the House continued to adjourn for lack of a quorum."3 On
Saturday, March 14th, the House Journal records that three new
members from Virginia, James Madison," 4 John Page, and Richard
Bland Lee, "appeared and took their seats," but that the House
adjourned for lack of a quorum." 5 Finally, on April 1, 1789,
Representatives James Schureman from New Jersey and Thomas
Scott from Pennsylvania appeared, bringing the total to thirty
members, and finally, the journal noted that "a quorum, consisting
of a majority of the whole number," was present." 6 The House then
proceeded to elect a Speaker, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg of
Pennsylvania, who took the chair to preside over the House." 7
In the Senate, the record is even clearer that the senators thought
a quorum required the presence of senators representing a majority
of the seats authorized by the Constitution. Because Rhode Island
and North Carolina had not yet ratified the Constitution, there
were twenty-two seats in the Senate on opening day of the First
Congress.18 There were only twenty elected senators, however,
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 4.
114. As Chief Justice Taft wrote in Myers, the First Congress was
the Congress in which Mr. Madison, one of the first in the framing of the
Constitution, led also in the organization of the Government under it. It was a
Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they
should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the interpretation of that
fundamental instrument.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926).
115. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826). On March
25, 1789, Representative Fisher Ames wrote in a letter: "[W]e have twenty-six
representatives; and as thirty are necessary to make a quorum, we are still in a state of
inaction. This is a very mortifying situation.... I am inclined to believe that the languor of the
Old Confederation ... is transfused into the members of the new Congress." This letter is
quoted in ROBERT V. REMINI, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
12 (2006).
116. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1826).
117. REMINI, supra note 115, at 15.
118. 1 JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 5 (1789) [hereinafter SENATE
JOURNAL].
1052 [Vol. 48:1025
HOW TO SURVIVE A TERRORIST ATTACK
because New York would not elect its senators until July 15, 1789.'19
On March 4, only eight senators appeared in New York City, six of
whom had been Constitutional Convention delegates-John
Langdon of New Hampshire, Caleb Strong of Massachusetts,
William Johnson and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Robert
Morris of Pennsylvania, and William Few of Georgia. 20 On March
11, these senators sent a letter to the twelve elected senators who
had not yet arrived, urging them to come to New York, "[i]t being of
the utmost importance that a quorum sufficient to proceed to
business be assembled as soon as possible."'' A week later, they
wrote their absent colleagues again, urgently requesting their
"immediate attendance" so they would not disappoint the "anxious
expectations" of the public.'22 Throughout the month, these senators
would meet, then adjourn because a quorum was not present, even
after March 28, the day the eleventh senator, Jonathan Elmer of
New Jersey, appeared in New York.'23 The Senate only organized on
April 6, the day the twelfth senator, Richard Henry Lee from
Virginia, appeared; as the record notes, a quorum, "the whole
number of Senators of the United States," was present.'24
This Senate record makes it clear that although the senators were
eager to organize and proceed to business,'25 they thought that a
quorum consisted of a majority of the total number of Senate seats,
or twelve out of the total twenty-two seats, not the total number of
elected senators, eleven out of the twenty elected seats.'26 If the
senators in attendance, many of whom had helped draft and
119. The newly elected senators from New York, Rufus King and Philip Schuyler, appeared
in the Senate on July 25 and July 27, respectively, were sworn in, and took their seats. Id. at
69, 70.
120. 1 SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 118, at 5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 6. As Vermeule points out, the First Congress was suffering from what he calls
an "infinite regress" problem experienced by legislatures forming for the first time. Vermeule,
supra note 70, at 368. The Constitution had created a mechanism to compel the attendance
of members when a quorum was lacking, but that power could not be invoked until a quorum
appeared. Id. at 368-69. In other words, the two houses were completely at the mercy of their
colleagues to appear in sufficient numbers to do business. Id.
123. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 118, at 7.
124. Id.
125. The Senate's first order of business was to conduct a joint meeting with the House to
count and certify the ballots electing George Washington as president and John Adams as vice
president. Id.
126. See supra note 120.
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approve the new Constitution under which they were operating, had
viewed the quorum provision as requiring a majority of elected
senators, they would have declared a majority present on March 28
and organized on that date.
The principle that quorums in the House and Senate consisted of
a majority of the whole number of authorized seats appears to have
been consistently observed in the pre-Civil War period. During a
debate over the meaning of the Quorum Clause in the Thirty-
seventh Congress on July 9, 1862, the President pro tempore of the
Senate, Solomon Foot of Vermont, placed in the record a long
memorandum asserting that "the House or the Senate, as bodies,
are composed or constituted of the whole number of members to
which the several States may or shall be entitled to have in those
bodies respectively."' 27 To prove that this principle was the "general
practice" of the previous thirty-six Congresses, 2 8 Foot submitted to
the record a list of numerous precedents demonstrating that the
early Congresses based their quorum numbers on the majority of
the whole number of seats, rather than on the number of actual
members occupying those seats. 129
127. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3191-92 (1862).
128. Id. Foot added testimony as evidence of the practice of previous Congresses:
The Chair will further state, as a member of the body, and in his right as a
Senator, that some ten or eleven years ago this very question was debated at
length, and with great ability, by many of the oldest and ablest members of the
body, by Mr. Clay, by Mr. Berrien, by Mr. Underwood, by Mr. Badger, and
others, and it was decided by an emphatic vote that it required a majority of the
whole number entitled to seats in the body to constitute a quorum. The Chair
would follow that emphatic decision of the body since the present occupant of the
Chair has been a member of it.
Id. at 3022. Writing in 1916, former Representative and House historian De Alva Stanwood
Alexander wrote:
The important question is, therefore, what constitutes a majority? Speaker Clay
held that it was one more than one half of all possible members. Thus, if an
apportionment provided for a total of 400 members, 201 constituted a quorum.
This ruling remained unquestioned until the Civil War deprived the House of
many members.
DE ALVA STANWOOD ALEXANDER, HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 155 (1916).
129. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3191-92 (1862). Foot's memo was comprehensive
and honest enough to include instances from the Seventh and Tenth Congresses in which the
House appeared to have used not the whole number of seats, but the whole number of
"qualified" seats, to determine a quorum. Id. at 3191. Foot characterized these episodes as
"very few and detached exceptions, which should have no consideration or value in view of
general practice." Id.
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In his famous Lex Parliamentaria Americana, published in 1856,
parliamentarian Luther Stearns Cushing wrote that the House
and Senate were assemblies whose numbers were fixed by the
Constitution, and therefore their quorums were determined
according to "the number of which such assembly may consist and
not the number of which it does in fact consist, at the time in
question."13 ° Summarizing the quorum rules in the House and
Senate, Cushing wrote:
Thus, in the senate of the United States, to which by the
constitution each State in the Union may elect two members,
and which may consequently consist of two members from each
State, the quorum is a majority of that number, whether the
States have all exercised their constitutional right or not. So, in
the second branch of congress, in which, by the constitution, the
whole number of representatives of which the house may consist
is fixed by the last apportionment, increased by the number of
members to which newly admitted States may be entitled, the
quorum is a majority of the whole number, including the number
to which such new States may be entitled, whether they have
elected members of not, and making no deductions on account of
vacant districts. 131
One of the precedents Cushing cited came from House proceedings
on June 5, 1848, the day a representative from the newly admitted
State of Wisconsin appeared on the House floor.'32 The two new
Wisconsin seats increased the number of seats in the House from
228 to 230, although three seats were vacant at the time. 133 After
only 114 members voted on a motion to recommit a bill to the
Judiciary Committee, Representative George Jones of Tennessee
made a point of order that a quorum was not present. 3 4 After a
discussion in which the Clerk of the House maintained that 114 was
a quorum of the current number of 227 members, the Speaker,
130. LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 100 (9th ed. 1874).
131. Id. (footnotes omitted). This passage was cited by Senator Charles Manderson of
Nebraska during an 1893 debate on the quorum requirement. 25 CONG. REC. 2395 (1893).
132. CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 821 (1848).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Robert C. Winthrop of Massachusetts, ruled that a quorum would
be 116, "not less than a majority of the whole number of members
of which the House is composed," including the two new Wisconsin
seats. 135
III. CIVIL WAR CRISIS AND THE RUPTURE WITH EARLIER PRACTICE
The early Congresses clearly understood the Constitution's
quorum requirement to mean that a majority to do business in the
House and Senate meant a majority of legislators from all of the
extant seats in each chamber. In the mathematical terms some
observers have employed to discuss legislative quorums, the
denominators the First Congress used to determine the presence of
a quorum were sixty-five for the House and twenty-six for the
Senate.'36 The denominators the Second through Thirty-sixth
Congresses used for this calculation were always, for the House, the
legally apportioned number of seats and, for the Senate, twice the
number of states currently admitted to the Union.
As a precedent, this consistent practice of the early Congresses
carries decisive weight when interpreting the meaning of Article I,
Section 5, Clause 1. But aside from the constitutional argument, it
makes sense as a matter of policy. The majoritarian guarantee that
the Framers deliberately built into the legislative structure would
be undermined if members of the House and Senate had the ability
to change the denominator to a number lower than the "whole
number of members to which the several States may or shall be
entitled."'37 The Framers quite intentionally fixed the majority
quorum requirement in the Constitution to insulate it from the
manipulations of future Congresses. As this Part will demonstrate,
however, the Civil War Congresses dramatically broke with this
principle and later Congresses have followed their example.
135. JOURNALOFTHE HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 876 (June 8, 1848).
136. See supra Part I.D.
137. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (1862).
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A. Change in the House
Congress's reading of the quorum requirement abruptly changed
during the Civil War years, when state secessions placed great
strains on the operations of the House and the Senate. After eleven
states seceded from the Union in late 1860 and early 1861 and did
not send representatives or senators to the Thirty-seventh
Congress,"' the two chambers found it difficult to muster a majority
of the full number of those bodies if they included the seats to which
the seceding states were entitled. For example, while the full,
apportioned number of seats in the House of Representatives in the
Thirty-seventh Congress was 238,139 the First Session of that
Congress had 183 elected members.14 ° A quorum based on the full
number of apportioned seats would have been 120 seats, or sixty-six
percent of the elected members, while a majority of the elected
Representatives would have been ninety-two.14 1 In other words, a
quorum based on the majority of all apportioned House seats would
have actually required a two-thirds supermajority of elected
representatives.
The Republican leaders of the Thirty-seventh Congress were
stuck. For obvious political reasons, the House and Senate could not
reduce the total number of apportioned seats; that would have been
tantamount to admitting that the eleven southern states had the
power to secede and were no longer part of the Union. But they were
having very practical problems assembling groups large enough to
meet the constitutional quorum requirement as it had been
consistently applied in the First through Thirty-sixth Congresses.
1
'
4 2
138. See STEPHEN G. CHRISTIANSON, FACTS ABOUT CONGRESS 154 (1996).
139. After the Seventh Census in 1850, the apportioned number of seats was 234, to which
was added Minnesota (2 seats) in 1858, Oregon (1 seat) in 1859, and Kansas (1 seat) in 1861.
U.S. GoV'. PRINTING OFFICE, CONG. DIRECTORY, 108th Cong. 543 (2003). The eleven seceding
states were apportioned fifty-nine of these seats, although a few representatives from these
states appeared for the Thirty-seventh Congress. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 138, at 154.
140. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1861). A later scholar has concluded that the
Thirty-seventh Congress "eventually consisted of 181 seats." LEONARD P. CURRY, BLUEPRINT
FOR MODERN AMERICA: NONMILITARY LEGISLATION OF THE FIRST CIVIL WAR CONGRESS 34
(1968).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 210 (1861).
142. Scholars have noted that because they held only forty-four seats in the Thirty-seventh
Congress, House Democrats were completely powerless and had high rates of absenteeism,
which would have only exacerbated House leaders' concerns about establishing a quorum. See
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A few months earlier, Lincoln had concisely explained the broader
political dilemma to his aide, John Hay. The central question raised
by the secession crisis, he said, was "whether in a free government
the minority have the right to break up the government whenever
they choose.' 14' The ad hoc solution congressional leaders developed
in the Civil War years was to change the definition of the House and
the Senate from all the seats to which the states were entitled to the
total number of members elected to the House and Senate. In other
words, the "House" and "Senate" were no longer defined as cham-
bers with a statutorily fixed number of seats, but rather as cham-
bers made up of a constantly fluctuating number of representatives.
During the Special War Session called in the summer of 1861, the
problem came to a head in the House of Representatives during a
procedural vote on a joint resolution creating a board to oversee the
United States Naval Academy. 14' The motion to second the previous
question prevailed on a vote of fifty-two to forty-one, a total number
of votes well below 120.145 After the vote result was announced,
Representative Clement Vallandingham, a so-called "Peace Demo-
crat" from Ohio, made a point of order that a quorum had not
voted. 146 The Speaker of the House, Galusha Grow of Pennsylvania,
then had the Clerk read Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 of the
Constitution, followed by Article 1, Section 2, stating that "[t]he
House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen
every second year by the people of the several States.' 147 From these
provisions, Grow reasoned that in the Thirty-seventh Congress, the
House consisted of 183 "chosen" members and that a quorum of the
House was therefore ninety-two members, a majority of which
would be forty-seven. 48 As the House Journal recorded, "[t]he
JOEL H. SILBEY, A RESPECTABLE MINORITY: THE DEMOcRATIc PARTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA,
1860-1868, at 50-51 (1977).
143. INSIDE LINCOLN'S WHITE HOUSE: THE COMPLETE CIVIL WAR DIARY OF JOHN HAY 20
(Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner Ettlinger eds., 1997).
144. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 210.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. There does not appear to be an empirical study of how often the Civil War House
actually acted with fewer than 120 representatives after it adopted this rule change. The
Reconstruction Congresses faced an analogous issue during the ratification of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See generally John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the
Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001) (discussing the ratification process
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Speaker decided that, inasmuch as ninety-two members constituted
a majority of the members chosen, a quorum had voted." '149 The
Speaker's ruling was not challenged and business continued.
B. Change in the Senate
While the House changed its long-standing interpretation of the
Quorum Clause with little debate in the course of a mundane
procedural vote, the Civil War Era Senate altered its interpretation
of the quorum rule only after several votes, and a long, spirited
debate extending over several years. In the Senate of the Thirty-
seventh Congress, twenty-four of the thirty-four states had sent
senators, which meant that of the fifty-one elected senators, thirty-
five senators, or almost seventy percent, had to be present to
conduct business.
150
During the Second Session of this Congress in 1862, Republican
Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced a resolution stating
"[t]hat a majority of the Senators duly elected and entitled to seats
in this body is a constitutional quorum."15' After being unfavorably
reported from the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sherman brought
his resolution up on the Senate floor for debate in late June and
early July of 1862.5 Sherman and other supporters of the rule
change openly admitted the reason for the proposal was that the
number of senators present and able to conduct business was
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments). The difficult question at that time
was, under the Article V ratification process, should the post-War southern governments be
counted for the purposes of determining when three-fourths of the states had ratified these
amendments? While some congressional leaders argued that the southern states were
"conquered provinces" and should not be included in the denominator, others argued they
should be included in the denominator only after they had formed new post-rebellion
governments. Id. at 390-93. The solution adopted was to include the rebel states for the
purposes of calculating three-fourths state ratification. Id. at 398. At the same time, Congress
also made it clear to the rebel states that it would recognize their new governments on the
condition that they ratify these constitutional amendments. Id. at 406.
149. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1861).
150. Included in the total number of elected senators are the single senator from Tennessee
(future president Andrew Johnson) and the two senators from nonsecessionist Virginia
(current day West Virginia), who were of dubious legal status. CHRISTIANSON, supra note 138,
at 154.
151. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3021 (1862).
152. Id.
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perilously close to thirty-five senators. 5' Sherman stated that "[t] he
condition of the Senate is such that I am satisfied any casualty
would prevent us doing business under the present practice."'54 He
observed that there were only thirty-seven senators "accessible" in
Washington and that "two or three are sick, several have gone away,
and others desire to go.' 1 55 Under the current circumstances, he was
very concerned that a small group of senators, even from a small
state like Delaware or Rhode Island, could take advantage of this
situation, depart the Senate and deprive the chamber of its ability
to do business. 156 Acquiescing in the principle that a quorum is
thirty-five senators, he argued, would mean "[a] very small minority
of the people of the United States might break up the Govern-
ment."'57 Citing the 1861 House ruling, he argued that changing the
quorum requirement was constitutionally defensible and was also
justified "on the simple ground of absolute necessity."''
On the constitutionality of the change, Sherman acknowledged it
had been the practice since the First Congress that the secretary of
the Senate "always fixes the number of the quorum at the com-
mencement of the session, taking the whole number who could be
possibly elected, and taking the majority of that number; and that
has been acted upon rather by consent, by silence, as the
quorum."'59 But, he argued, it was an arbitrary rule and must now
be changed to address the new circumstances. It was a workable
rule in a Senate where all states sent senators and there were a few
vacancies at one time, but now must be changed. "In my judgment,"
Sherman continued, "if you recognize the doctrine that it requires
a majority of all who might constitute the Senate, two from each
state, to make a quorum, you will break up the Senate, as you
certainly would have broken up the House of Representatives."'' °
To further explain his reading of the Quorum Clause, Sherman
took up the provision in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 allowing a
number of senators smaller than a quorum to "adjourn from day to
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3190.
157. Id. at 3022.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 3190.
160. Id. at 3022.
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day" and to "compel the attendance of the absent members in such
a manner and under such penalties as each House may provide. 16'
The intent of this provision was to give members present in a house
the power to bring absent members back to the chamber in order to
make a quorum to conduct business. But the current problem,
Sherman argued, is not absent members, but nonexistent members.
He asked: "Can we compel the attendance of men who are not
elected? Many of those States have no Senators. They have not been
elected. They have failed to elect them for reasons that we know
very well. How can we who are here, compel their attendance?"'162
After a long debate, during which the acting President pro tempore
of the Senate, Solomon Foot of Vermont, inserted a detailed analysis
of quorum practices in the House and Senate from the First
Congress to the Thirty-sixth,'63 the Senate voted to table Sherman's
resolution by a vote of nineteen to eighteen.'64
Two years later, during the First Session of the Thirty-eighth
Congress, Sherman brought up his resolution again and the Senate
again engaged in a long, passionate debate on the meaning of the
Quorum Clause.'65 It is obvious from the records that in this period,
the Senate was having a difficult time mustering a quorum based
on the whole number of Senate seats. Senator Reverdy Johnson of
Maryland supported the rule change, arguing there was a funda-
mental difference between an absent member, the type addressed
in the constitutional quorum provision, and the vacant seats created
by states not willing to send senators.'66 Speaking specifically to the
first southern state that had seceded, Johnson asked what harm
proceeding with a lower quorum would do the people of South
Carolina: "What injustice is to be done them? Who keeps South
Carolina from electing her Senators?"'67
Leading the debate against the rule change was Senator John
Davis of Kentucky, who cited the Constitutional Convention
debates, Senate tradition, and the importance of certainty in the
161. Id. at 3190 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1).
162. Id. at 3022.
163. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
164. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3194 (1862).
165. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2085 (1864).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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legislative process to argue that the constitutional quorum provi-
sions required the attendance of senators from a majority of all
possible Senate seats." After reviewing the Constitutional
Convention debates from August 10, 1789, Davis concluded:
The reasonable presumption is that the Convention did not
intend that a cabal of both or either House of Congress should
ever exercise so much of the legislative powers of the Govern-
ment; and therefore required the quorum of both to do business
to be a majority of the whole number of its members. It intended
further that it should be certainly known at all times and beyond
doubt or contingency what the quorum of each successive Senate
and House was; so that less than that quorum might not from
inadvertence or ignorance upon any question of the number of
the members of either House undertake at any time to transact
business." 9
Unlike the quorum debate two years earlier, the Senate voted for
the rule change by a margin of twenty-six to eleven, which in its
final form, resolved "[t]hat a quorum of the Senate consists of a
majority of the Senators duly chosen."17 Four years later, appar-
ently to block senators chosen by the illegally reconstructed
governments of several southern states,'7 ' the Senate modified this
rule to read that a quorum consists of a majority of the senators
"duly chosen and sworn."'72 That modification is currently codified
in the first paragraph of Senate Rule VI.'
168. Id. at 2082-83.
169. Id. at 2083.
170. Id. at 2087.
171. IV ASHER C. HINDS, HINDs' PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES § 2892 (1907).
172. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1628 (1868); see also ALEXANDER, supra note 128,
at 155 (discussing the purpose of the language "duly chosen and sworn").
173. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. NO., 106-15 (2000); FLOYD M. RIDDICK &
ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S SENATE PROCEDURE 1039 (1992). The Senate debated this question
again in 1893, during a contentious all-night debate on silver legislation. In the course of the
debate, Senator Edward Wolcott of Colorado made a point of order that a quorum was not
present when forty-three senators answered the quorum call. The Senate at that time
consisted of eighty-eight seats (a majority of which was forty-five), but the Senate's "duly
chosen and sworn" rule set the quorum number instead at forty-three since three of the seats
were currently vacant. After the vice president (Adlai Stevenson of Illinois) ruled that forty-
three senators satisfied the quorum requirement, Senator Wolcott appealed the ruling of the
chair. His appeal lost by a vote of thirty-eight to five. 25 CONG. REC. 2396 (1893).
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C. The Continuing Evolution of the House Quorum Rules
Speaker Grow's 1861 ruling that, for the purposes of determining
a quorum, the House of Representatives consisted of all "chosen"
members, was observed until 1890. During a dispute over a
contested election in the famously fractious Fifty-first Congress,
Republican Speaker Joseph Reed interpreted Grow's "those chosen"
to mean those members "chosen and living" so the House could
conduct business during a Democratic walkout.'74 Fifteen years
later, on a day he was several members short of his quorum number
of 193, Speaker Joseph Cannon reexamined the Civil War Era
debates in the House and Senate and the later precedents. 175 He
issued a new ruling that "after the House is once organized a
quorum consists of a majority of those Members chosen, sworn, and
living, whose membership has not been terminated by resignation
or by the action of the House."'76 This new formulation allowed him
to remove from his denominator two members who had been elected
but not yet sworn in, and one member who had resigned, and
thereby determine that the 191 members present on the House floor
were a quorum.17 7 This so-called "Joe Cannon Precedent of 1906"
continues to be the rule in the modern House of Representatives and
became part of the standing House Rules in the 109th Congress.7 8
174. The "chosen" standard resulted in a quorum of 166 members (the total number of
apportioned seats in that Congress was 330), while the "chosen and living" standard required
a quorum of only 164 since four members had died. 21 CONG. REC. 10234-35 (1890).
Republican representative, and future president, William McKinley of Ohio accused the
Democratic floor leader Charles Crisp of Georgia of holding 100 members off the floor to halt
business. Id. at 10234. Other Republicans insulted these Democratic members by calling them
"secessionists." Id. at 10234-36. The day before this exchange, Democratic representative C.
Buckley Kilgore of Texas literally kicked down a door to the House chamber to escape a
quorum call ordered by Speaker Reed, which earned him the nickname "Kicking Buck
Kilgore." WILLIAM A. ROBINSON, THOMAS B. REED: PARLIAMENTARIAN 248 (1930). Although
Speaker Reed did not change the precedent during a lengthy debate on September 19, 1890,
six months later he inserted a statement declaring that the proper interpretation of the 1861
"those chosen" Speaker Grow precedent was members who were both elected and living. 22
CONG. REC. 3815 (1891). As noted in Part IV of this Article, the Ballin decision was the result
of another Democratic walkout during a different contested election fight in the closely
divided Fifty-first Congress.
175. 40 CONG. REC. 5354 (1906).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. HOUSE RuLEs, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 5(c)(7)(B).
20061 1063
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
In the 108th Congress, as part of its effort to address post-9/11
"continuity" issues, the House adopted a standing rule formalizing
the practice that had developed since Speaker Grow's 1861 ruling in
which the Speaker periodically adjusts the "whole number of the
House" to reflect "the death, resignation, expulsion, disqualification,
or removal of a Member."' 9 This adjustment to the denominator has
the effect of lowering the number of members needed to make a
quorum. For example, when Representative Christopher Cox
resigned his seat to head the Securities and Exchange Commission
on September 2, 2005, the Speaker pro tempore announced to the
House that he had lowered the "whole number of the House" to
433.180 Immediately after Representative John Campbell, who was
elected in a special election to replace Cox in California's 48th
District, was sworn in on December 7, 2005, the Speaker announced
he had increased the "whole number of the House" back up to 434.111
D. The Constitutional Significance of the New Quorum Rules
Earlier sections of this Article demonstrated that the intention of
the Framers-as it can be discerned from their deliberations, from
the practices of the early Congresses, and from the text of the
Constitution itself-was that a quorum was to be based on the
House and Senate as institutions, rather than on the fluctuating
numbers of people serving in them at any given moment."i 2 This
Part has shown that during the constitutional and political crisis of
the Civil War Era, Congress switched from an institutional
definition of the House and Senate to a personal one. This new
definition of the House and Senate, which is the standard both
chambers use in their current practices, was based on the number
of people actually occupying seats in those two bodies, usually a
number slightly lower than the number of all possible seats.
Although the legislators who made this fundamental change in
179. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108TH CONG. (2003) Rule XX, cl. 5(c),
recodified as Rule XX, cl. 5(d) in the rules of the 109th Congress, with additional language
clarifying that the swearing in of a new representative also allows the Speaker to adjust the
number of the whole House. HOUSE RULES, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 5(d).
180. 151 CONG. REC. H7616 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 2005).
181. Id. at H11187 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2005).
182. See supra Part II.
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practice said they were forced to do so by "absolute necessity," their
reading of Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 was incorrect and later
Congresses have incorrectly followed it.183
During the Civil War and Reconstruction periods, the United
States government was under severe stress and took actions that in
hindsight appear to be extraconstititional. Before he convened the
Special Session of 1861, President Lincoln increased the size of the
army without authorization, spent money that was not appropriated
by the Congress, and suspended the right of habeas corpus." As
one later scholar of the era observed, "the Civil War stands out as
an eccentric period, a time when constitutional restraints did not
fully operate and when the 'rule of law' largely broke down."'85 A
significant part of Powell, for example, was its finding that, during
the Reconstruction period, the House unconstitutionally rejected
otherwise qualified members of Congress from former states of the
Confederacy on the basis that they had given "aid and comfort" to
the enemy. 8 As reviewed earlier in this Part, 87 the 1868 Senate
rule change, from "chosen" to "chosen and sworn," appears to be part
of an effort to avoid seating otherwise qualified senators.
In an analogous case reexamining a statute dating from the
Reconstruction period,'88 the Supreme Court held that, during the
183. Looking back on the Senate debates that led to the quorum rule change in 1864,
Senator Charles Manderson of Nebraska argued in 1893 that prior to the Civil War, the
Quorum Clause had always been interpreted to require a majority from all seats in the
Senate. He said:
This language is exceedingly plain, and it is supported by all the early decisions
... in the two Houses of Congress. It continued as the measure of the quorum
until the rule which has been read was adopted, after considerable debate, on
the 4th day of May, 1864. The circumstances of that time are recalled by the
mere mention of the date. Both Houses of Congress were under great stress.
Certain states had seceded from the Union; they were without representation
in either House of Congress; and it was under the stress of the great necessity
that the constitutional provision should receive strain that this rule was
adopted.
25 CONG. REC. 2395 (1893). Manderson conceded that since that time, the Senate had
consistently applied the "duly chosen and sworn" rule, but also pointed out that "if the rule
of the Senate as read is in contravention of the constitutional provision, then, of course, it falls
to the ground." Id.
184. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 514 (rev. ed. 1964).
185. Id. at 521.
186. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 544 (1969).
187. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
188. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
furious battle over President Andrew Johnson's attempt to remove
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, the Fortieth Congress had
unconstitutionally passed the Tenure of Office Act and other laws
attempting to restrict the President's ability to dismiss executive
branch officials." 9 After examining the Article II grant of executive
power to the President, which included a review of how the First
Congress treated the President's right to dismiss officials, Chief
Justice Taft concluded that the consistent practices of the early
Congresses trumped the actions of a single Congress acting in the
heat of the Reconstruction controversy:
The extremes to which the majority in both Houses carried
legislative measures in that matter are now recognized by all
who calmly review the history of that episode in our Govern-
ment, leading to articles of impeachment against President
Johnson, and his acquittal. Without animadverting on the
character of the measures taken, we are certainly justified in
saying that they should not be given the weight affecting proper
constitutional construction to be accorded to that reached by the
First Congress of the United States during a political calm and
acquiesced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a
century .... 190
Reserving judgment about whether changing the quorum require-
ment was an absolutely necessary step to allow the legislative
branch to continue operating during the Civil War, it was clearly a
break with the practice of the First through Thirty-sixth Congresses
and with the intentions of the Framers of the Constitution.
Supporters of the change admitted at the time that their construc-
tion of the constitutional quorum provision did not accord with that
of the First Congress, a construction that had then been "acquiesced
in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a century."'191
Their argument boiled down to the contention that there was more
189. Id. at 163-64.
190. Id. at 175-76; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826-28 (1997) (discussing the
historical background of the Myers decision).
191. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176. A useful contrast to this rupture in practice is the continuous
congressional assertion of the power (implied in its legislative power) to conduct oversight on
the executive branch. The fact that the early Congresses asserted this power and later
Congresses followed them without disruption carries decisive weight in a court's assessment
of this power. See McGrain v. Daughterty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
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than one proper way to read the constitutional quorum provision
and that the houses were within their powers to choose a different
construction than that which the First through Thirty-sixth
Congresses had chosen.
This Article has already argued that the novel construction of the
majority quorum requirement legislators devised during the Civil
War was incorrect. The next Part will examine the congressional
rule-making power and show that it does not give the House and
Senate the power to reinterpret constitutionally fixed procedural
rules. In other words, the actions of the Thirty-Seventh through
109th Congresses to break with the original construction of the
Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 quorum requirement are unconstitu-
tional, and the two chambers' long acquiescence in the practice of
defining the houses in terms of their elected members does nothing
to justify them. As the Powell Court pointed out, a series of congres-
sional precedents has little or no value when those precedents do
not comply with the Constitution: 'That an unconstitutional action
has been taken before surely does not render that same action any
less unconstitutional at a later date."
1 92
IV. BALLINAND THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
RULE-MAKING POWER
As the Civil War Congresses struggled to function when the
southern states were not electing members, the crux of the question
legislators faced was whether their constitutional rule-making
power covered their novel interpretation of the Quorum Clause.
Policymakers face the same question today as they think about how
Congress would function in the aftermath of an attack that radically
diminished the size of Congress: How far can Congress exercise its
rule-making powers before it bumps up against constitutionally
established procedural provisions that it lacks the power to change?
While some scholars and legislators argue for broad "flexibility" in
where the line should be drawn,'93 the answer this Article offers is
192. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
193. As Professor Walter Dellinger has expressed this idea, "the Constitution is flexible
enough to permit a number of different formulas for determining a quorum-and the fact that
Congress is empowered by the rulemaking clause to adopt a relatively strict version of the
rule does not mean that it is prohibited from adopting a looser version." Continuity of
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that the Civil War Era legislators, and the legislators who have
followed their interpretation of the Quorum Clause, went too far;
they altered a constitutional procedural rule that the Framers
clearly intended to be fixed once and for all in the Constitution. The
practice of defining the House and Senate in terms of the elected
members of those two bodies is not consistent with Article I, Section
5, Clause 1 of the Constitution. A closer examination of the Congres-
sional rule-making power will help clarify this point.
Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the Constitution gives both the
House and the Senate the power to "determine the Rules of its
Proceedings.'94 It was not a controversial principle at the time of
the Constitutional Convention that each chamber should have the
ability to adopt rules binding on its members. As Justice Story
wrote, "[t]he humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this
power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation
of a like authority."'95 Over the two centuries since that time, each
chamber has developed complex standing rules and precedents to
govern its proceedings. Under normal circumstances, in light of the
Constitution's clear textual commitment to the Congress of power
to govern its own affairs and out of deference to a coordinate branch
of government, the judicial branch carefully refrains from interpret-
ing or ruling on the houses' procedures.196 As the Supreme Court
noted in Christoffel v. United States, "[c]ongressional practice in the
transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our
Congress: An Examination of the Existing Quorum Requirement and the Mass Incapacitation
of Members: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 108th Cong. 34 (2004) [hereinafter House
Continuity Hearing], available at http://www.rules.house.gov/jccos/95-383.pdf (statement of
Prof. Walter Dellinger). Another policy justification for such flexibility is an argument similar
to the one used during the Civil War Congresses: if a small "rump Congress" cannot act in the
aftermath of an attack, then the attackers have won. See Howard M. Wasserman, Continuity
of Congress: A Play in Three Stages, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 949, 963 (2004). According to another
theory, the source of a rump Congress's power to act would come from both its rule-making
power and from its Article I, Section 4 power to regulate the "Times, Places, and Manner" of
congressional elections. Paul Taylor, Alternatives to a Constitutional Amendment: How
Congress May Provide for the Quick, Temporary Filling of House Member Seats in Emergencies
by Statute, 10 J.L. & POLY 373, 378-80 (2002).
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
195. 3 STORY, supra note 44, at 298.
196. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 143 (1963) (White, J., dissenting) ('The role that
the courts play in adjudicating questions involving the rules of either house must of necessity
be a limited one, for the manner in which a house or committee of Congress chooses to run its
business ordinarily raises no justiciable controversy.").
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concern."'197 Even when congressional proceedings affect the rights
of people who are not members of Congress, courts must give great
weight to the chambers' interpretations of their own rules. 198 In
certain extraordinary cases, however, courts have heard cases in
which the exercise of the congressional rule-making power bumps
up against other constitutional principles. In Christoffel, for
example, the United States Supreme Court heard a case in which
congressional committee procedure played a key role in a criminal
indictment. 99 In a more recent case, courts heard a constitutional
challenge to a House of Representatives rule granting limited voting
rights to delegates from U.S. territories.2"
The case in which the Supreme Court made its most extensive
analysis of the nature and limitations of the congressional rule-
making power was the case of United States v. Ballin,2  a late
nineteenth-century case that coincidentally involved the constitu-
tional quorum requirement. The origin of this case was a quorum-
busting technique, sometimes called a "filibuster," that both parties
used in that era to halt business in the House. 2 Under the House
rules at that time, the Speaker established the presence of a quorum
through counting the voting members. In an era of a closely divided
House, members of a "factious minority" could refuse to vote on
certain measures, which forced the majority party to produce all of
its members or else fail to establish a quorum to do business. The
issue came to a head after the 1888 elections, when Republicans
won the majority for the first time in fourteen years. The new
Speaker of the Fifty-first Congress, Thomas B. Reed of Maine, found
himself in the position of having 166 Republican members, the exact
197. 338 U.S. 84, 88 (1949).
198. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932); see Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (dismissing suit by House members over committee assignment
rules out of "prudential and separation-of-powers concerns," even though the suit was a
justiciable controversy).
199. Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 88.
200. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
201. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
202. The use of this tactic in the House of Representatives appears to go back as far as the
1830s. SARAH H. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 31 (1997). According to Alexander, John Quincy Adams was the
first representative who refused to answer a call to vote on a motion. ALEXANDER, supra note
128, at 158.
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number needed to satisfy the quorum requirement. °3 Democrats
could halt business in the House by simply refusing to vote and
requiring the Republicans to establish a quorum with their
members alone. On January 29, 1890, Democrats halted business
on a contested election case by remaining silent to defeat the
quorum requirement. °4 Speaker Reed retaliated by announcing the
names of members "present and refusing to vote," thus establishing
that a majority of the House was present and the House was
thereby able to conduct business. °5 Speaker Reed's famous interpre-
tation of the quorum rule became "Rule XV" in the Fifty-first
Congress, the constitutionality of which became the central issue in
Ballin. 6
Ballin's factual basis was a tariff law the House passed later in
1890 under Speaker Reed's new quorum-counting rule."' The
plaintiff in the case was a New York merchant who had imported
worsted wool fabrics subject to that law. It had passed by the House
by a vote of 138 to none, with the Speaker noting, in accordance
with the new Rule XV, that 74 members were in the chamber but
not voting, which brought the total number of lawmakers present to
212, a figure well above the 166 members needed to make a
quorum. 2°" The merchant challenged the tariff as illegal, arguing
that it had not legitimately passed the House because a quorum had
not been present to do business."9 The Circuit Court in the South-
ern District of New York held that the tariff had not been properly
passed and the United States appealed to the Supreme Court.21°
203. Joseph G. Cannon, Dramatic Scenes in My Career in Congress. II - When Reed
Counted a Quorum, 140 HARPER'S MAG. 433, 434 (1920).
204. Id.
205. 21 CONG. REc. 949-51 (1890).
206. This provision is currently codified at HOUSE RULES, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 4(b).
Speaker Reed's ruling occurred in a period before the House had adopted rules for the Fifty-
first Congress and was therefore operating under "general parliamentary law." The House
only adopted its rules package (the famous "Reed's Rules") a few weeks later, on February 14,
1890. ROBINSON, supra note 174, at 231.
207. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3 (1892).
208. Id. at 3-4. As was discussed supra Part III.C, later in that same year, Speaker Reed
created a new "chosen and living" quorum standard in response to another Democratic
walkout during a contested election fight.
209. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 3.
210. Id. at 2-3.
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In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Brewer, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court and ruled that Speaker Reed's rule
change was a valid exercise of the House's rule-making power.211
Key to the Court's analysis was its distinction between the constitu-
tional requirement for a quorum to do business and the House's
power, deriving from its rule-making power, to adopt any reasonable
method it desired that would be "reasonably certain" to determine
whether a quorum was present.212 Just because there might be a
better way to count a quorum, or because the House had used a
different counting method for a long period of time, did not mean
the House lacked the power to adopt a different counting method.
The Court wrote:
It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to
make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the house...
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."'
The Court therefore found that Rule XV was valid and that the
record of House proceedings showed that under Speaker Reed's new
method of counting, 212 members were present when the tariff bill
was passed, which was a number well above the 166 members
required to constitute a quorum.214 The House clearly had a majority
to do business, the measure received a sufficient number of votes to
pass, and it then passed the Senate and received a presidential
signature; therefore, the statute was valid.
Despite some claims to the contrary,21 5 the facts of the case did
not require the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of the
majority quorum requirement of the Constitution. The Court simply
found that 212 Members present were indisputably a majority of the
House and that this number amply satisfied the Constitution's
211. Id. at 9.
212. Id. at 6.
213. Id. at 5.
214. Id. at 4 ("All that the Constitution requires is the presence of a majority, and when
that majority are present the power of the house arises.").
215. See, e.g., House Continuity Hearing, supra note 193, at 15 (statement of Charles
Johnson, Parliamentarian, U.S. House of Representatives).
2006] 1071
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
requirement that a majority be present to conduct business.216 The
Court examined contemporary common law, for both corporate
boards and legislative assemblies, and decided that it was an almost
universally accepted and noncontroversial principle that, once a
majority of a body was present, the body may take official actions.217
In its important discussion of the House rule-making power, the
Ballin decision also located the point at which the exercise of the
House rule-making power would be restrained by other constitu-
tional provisions:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained."' i
This passage lays out a relatively straightforward approach to
interpreting the congressional rule-making power and its relation-
ship to other constitutional procedural rules. Congress's constitu-
tional powers to make rules are constrained by other constitutional
provisions that explicitly limit them. As the extensive review of the
debate in the Constitutional Convention showed, the Framers gave
a great deal of thought to the procedural rules that should be
constitutionalized and those that should be left to later Congresses
to change as they would see fit. 19 While the Constitution gives
Congress extensive rule-making powers, it also contains a certain
number of other provisions that "directly regulate the internal
decisionmaking procedures of Congress.""22 Ballin makes it clear
that the rule-making power is limited by these fixed procedures.
The Supreme Court used this same reasoning in Powell to decide
that although the House and the Senate had exclusive power to
216. BaUin, 144 U.S. at 4.
217. Id. at 7-8.
218. Id. at 5. For the view that Bailin and later cases improperly extended judicial review
over Congress's exclusive rule-making powers, see generally Gregory Frederich Van
Tatenhove, Comment, A Question of Power: Judicial Review of Congressional Rules of
Procedure, 76 KY. L.J. 597 (1987-88).
219. See supra Part II.C.
220. Vermeule, supra note 70, at 361.
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determine whether a person had satisfied the constitutional
qualifications to serve in those houses, the Constitution prohibited
them from adding any new qualifications.22' Adding qualifications
to the three listed in Article I, Section 2 exceeded the Constitution's
grant to the legislative branch of the power to judge the qualifica-
tions of its members.222 In other words, the House's power to judge
elections in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 bumped up against, and
was limited by, the Constitution's precise definition of qualifications
in Article I, Section 2. Explaining this principle in Nixon v. United
States, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 'The decision as to whether
a Member satisfied these qualifications was placed with the House,
but the decision as to what these qualifications consisted of was
not. 223
The ability of the House and the Senate to determine their own
rules of procedure, as restrained by constitutionally fixed require-
ments-such as the right of a member to call for the yeas and nays,
with the affirmation of one-fifth of those present,2 4 or the require-
ment that a quorum be present to do business-demands a similar
exercise in constitutional interpretation. While the Constitution
gave the houses ample room to adopt and develop their own rules of
procedure, it prohibits them from adopting a rule, for example, that
would increase the affirmation requirement for the yeas and nays.225
Likewise, it prohibits them from conducting business with a number
smaller than a majority.2 Careful review of the Constitutional
Convention debates and the practice of the early Congresses makes
it clear that, for the purposes of the constitutional quorum require-
ment, "majority" means representatives from a majority of the
legally authorized seats in the House and the Senate. The two
houses have no power to alter this requirement.
221. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-22 (1969).
222. Id.
223. 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993).
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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V. THE QUORUM REQUIREMENT AND REPRESENTATION IN THE
POST-9/11 WORLD
The earlier sections of this Article have demonstrated that
the current quorum rules in the Senate and the House of
Representatives, which originated in a moment of extreme
constitutional stress during the Civil War, materially altered a
constitutional provision that the Framers intended to be unalter-
able. Under normal conditions in the modern Congress, however,
the debate over whether to define the House and Senate in terms of
the number of their seats or the members serving in them is purely
theoretical. While the two chambers regularly adjust their member-
ship numbers according to the "chosen and sworn" and the "chosen,
sworn, and living" standards to determine a quorum, the modern
House and Senate operate with almost full chambers. In other
words, the modern House always operates with a number signifi-
cantly higher than 218, and the Senate significantly higher than
fifty-one seats, which moots any real-world argument that their
rules conflict with the constitutional requirement of a majority to
conduct business.
In early 2005, for example, the Republican leadership of the
House decided to bring the House back into session on a Sunday
evening for a dramatic late-night debate on legislation related to
the controversial Terri Schiavo case.227 Although the House had
adjourned for a scheduled Easter recess that Thursday and the
House leadership gave members less than two days' notice that it
was going back into session, a number well in excess of 218 (at least
261) representatives returned to Washington on short notice to vote
on this legislation.22
While the drastically lower costs and greater speed of transporta-
tion mean that the modern House and Senate never struggle to
establish quorums the way legislatures in the eighteenth century
did, the Framers had similar expectations that under normal
conditions, Congress would work with numbers comfortably above
the majority quorum requirement. In response to criticisms in the
227. 151 CONG. REC. H1728 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005).
228. Id.
1074 [Vol. 48:1025
HOW TO SURVIVE A TERRORIST ATTACK
New York ratifying convention over the small size of the legislature,
Hamilton responded that out of the self-interest of the states, there
was not "a shadow of probability that the number of acting mem-
bers, in the general legislature, will be ever reduced to a bare
quorum." '229 Proportional representation in the House, he argued,
gave the larger states a strong incentive to fill all of their appor-
tioned seats and make sure those representatives appeared for the
legislative session.3 °
Where the modern quorum rules would run into very serious
problems, however, is in the case of a terrorist attack or other
calamitous event that reduced the number of living senators to
fewer than fifty-one or the number of representatives to fewer than
218. Under these scenarios, which were described at the beginning
of this Article, the legislative rules and the constitutional require-
ments of Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 would no longer peacefully
coexist: they would directly conflict. This Part will show that a
House or Senate operating with fewer members than the Constitu-
tion requires would not meet the basic representative requirements
Article I established for the legislative branch.
Though the arguments made in this Part apply equally to a
Senate operating with a greatly diminished number, this Part will
focus on the House. As was outlined at the beginning of this Article,
the Senate might briefly find itself with a diminished number, but
it would be able to take immediate steps to replenish itself through
the process authorized by the Seventeenth Amendment, which
allows state legislatures to empower their governors to name
temporary senators.23' On the other hand, because the House was
intended to be the most directly representational branch of the
government and because the House can replenish its seats only
through elections,232 the problems it would face in the aftermath of
a calamity would be more serious, for both logistical and constitu-
tional reasons.
229. 2 STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 58, at 263.
230. Id.
231. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see supra note 9.
232. See supra note 10.
2006] 1075
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
A. The Recent Congressional Response to the Disaster Scenarios
As was briefly reviewed at the beginning of this Article, under the
current House rules and the current House leaders' interpretation
of them, if a large number of representatives died in an attack, the
Speaker would mechanically reduce the House quorum number to
a number below 218.233 Representative David Dreier, the current
Chairman of the House Rules Committee, explained this process in
the following way:
Under another longstanding House precedent, which we codified
in clause 5(c) of rule XX, the Speaker is empowered to adjust the
whole number of the House, and thus its quorum, upon the
death or resignation of Members. Thus, if a catastrophe occurs
and 225 Members of the House were found dead, the whole
number of the House would be reduced to 210. The Speaker
under the rules would announce that fact to the House. The
number required for quorum would then, of course, be 106. The
House could proceed on that basis to conduct its business.234
Under the current interpretation of the House rules explained by
Chairman Dreier, the quorum to do business in the House is 218
members if all 435 apportioned seats are filled. If terrorists manage
to kill 225 of those members, however, the number of "chose, sworn,
and living" members would decrease to 210. The Speaker, using his
power derived from the Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 rule-making
power, would simply lower the number of the "whole House" to 210
and the House would continue to be properly constituted and able
to conduct business if 106, a majority of its members, are present.
In the plan, Dreier and other House leaders imagine, the House
would operate with this lowered quorum until the deceased
members are replaced, through elections held under a special forty-
nine-day expedited elections law.235 As newly elected members
appeared to take their seats, the Speaker would then adjust the
number of the whole House.
233. See supra notes 13-14, 179-80 and accompanying text.
234. House Continuity Hearing, supra note 193, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Dreier,
Chairman, House Comm. on Rules).
235. 2 U.S.C.A. § 8(b)(2) (West Supp. 2006).
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The House of Representatives recently exercised its rule-making
power to elaborate further on the power to lower its quorum when
it adopted a new rule addressing the issue of mass member
incapacitation at the beginning of the 109th Congress."' As
discussed at the beginning of this Article, this rule attempts to
address the scenario where terrorists managed to successfully
injure, but not kill, a large number of members of Congress.237
Under standing House rules, these incapacitated members would
still be "chosen, sworn, and living," but would not be able to perform
their duties in the House chamber.2"8 If 218 members were incapaci-
tated, there would be an insufficient number of members to make
a quorum and the House would not be able to conduct business.
Under this new incapacitation rule,239 in the aftermath of a
calamity, the House would first use the power it has under clause
5 of Rule XX to assemble a quorum through compelling the atten-
dance of absent members.24 ° Under this provision, fifteen members
may vote to send the sergeant-at-arms out to arrest those members
able to attend, and to otherwise account for absent members.241
When this process is exhausted, and a quorum has not yet ap-
peared, the House would go through a special seventy-two-hour
quorum call.242 During this period, the Speaker and other House
officers would be working to determine the nature and extent of the
crisis.243 At the end of this three-day quorum call, the Speaker could
then present to the House an unappealable "catastrophic quorum
failure report" concluding that a calamity has taken place, a large
number of members are incapacitated, and that, as a consequence,
the House is unable to assemble a majority of its whole number to
do business. 244 After another twenty-four-hour quorum call, the
quorum number would be automatically adjusted downward to a
236. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
238. HOUSE RULES, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 5(c).
239. Id.
240. The authority for this rule comes from the provision in Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1,
which allows a smaller number of members to compel the attendance of absent members
when a quorum is not present. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. See supra Part II.A for a
discussion of the origin of this provision.
241. HOUSE RULES, supra note 14, Rule XX, cl. 5(a), (b).
242. Id. cl. 5(c)(3).
243. Id.
244. Id. cl. 5(c)(4).
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new "provisional" quorum number.2 4' This provisional number
would be determined by excluding the members who have died and
those members whom the report deems incapacitated, unaccounted
for, or otherwise incapable of attending.2 46 With this new, smaller
provisional quorum, the House would then be able to conduct any
business it can currently conduct with a quorum of the whole
number of the House.
B. The Current Plan Fails To Meet the Basic Constitutional
Requirements of Representation
In spite of the good intentions of those who wrote them, these
rules would lead to an unconstitutional result and produce political
uncertainty in an already perilous moment for the government. As
this Article has argued, a fair and careful reading of Article I,
Section 5, Clause 1 and the history surrounding its genesis and
application in the early Congresses must conclude that a House and
Senate operating with small numbers would not be empowered to
legislate. But as the rest of this Section will explain, these rules also
have another problem; they would create a legislative body that
does not meet the basic structural requirements established in
Article 1.
For the purposes of argument, suppose that on a day in late
October during the 109th Congress, when the House and Senate
were in session and present in their respective chambers casting
votes, terrorists successfully attacked the Capitol building and
killed or incapacitated all persons present in or near the building at
that time. On that day, however, the entire Massachusetts congres-
sional delegation was not in Washington, but in Boston celebrating
a World Series victory by their beloved Boston Red Sox. Under the
current House continuity schemes, the ten Democratic representa-
tives from Massachusetts would constitute the "whole number of
the House," either through the "chosen, sworn, and living" principle
in the case of death, or through the "provisional number of the
House" procedure in the case of incapacitation.2 47 At this point, and
245. Id. c. 5(c)(1), (7).
246. Id. c. 5(c)(4).
247. See id. c. (5)(c)(7).
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probably for weeks afterward, six of these ten surviving representa-
tives would be able to do business, including electing a Speaker and
passing legislation. In addition, under the current law of presiden-
tial succession, the colleague they elect as Speaker would stand in
line to become president if the president and vice president had
perished in the attack.248
In any common sense usage of the word, these ten congressmen
could not be considered "representative" of the United States. They
were elected by only the citizens of one of the fifty states, they are
all white males, and they all belong to the political party that held
the lesser number of seats in the House before the attacks. Except
under House rules, it would be absurd to assert that a legislative
body composed of these ten men is "representative" of the United
States in any meaningful way. In an uncanny way, this group would
resemble the "junctos," or small groups of unrepresentative elected
officials that the Framers wanted to avoid when they adopted the
majority quorum rule.249 In other words, mechanically following the
mathematical process of denominator adjustment set out in the
current House rules would lead to an absurd, unrepresentative
result.25 °
248. 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2000); see also John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential
Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REv. 993 (2004) (discussing the
Presidential Succession Act).
249. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
250. In an 1890 debate on the quorum issue, Representative Joseph Bonaparte Cheadle of
Indiana provided the following quorum hypothetical, which could be dubbed the "Reality
Show" hypothetical:
It has been held by some that a majority of the members chosen to the House,
who are alive, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business; or, in
other words, that a majority of the Representatives from those districts that
have representation on this floor shall constitute a quorum of the House, within
the meaning of the law, for the purpose of transacting the public business.
But let us suppose a case that might arise. Suppose that a majority of any
House shall see proper to turn out one member, or a number of members, say
ten members; can it be held that that act would reduce the number of members
requisite under the Constitution to make a quorum to transact business by half
the number of members so unseated? If this could be held to be a correct
principle the size of the House might be reduced indefinitely.
21 CONG. REC. 10236 (1890). The facts of this hypothetical require one correction: as Powell
clarified, the number of members required to turn out members is two-thirds of the chamber,
see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506-12 (1969), so the number of members thrown out
of the body at any one time could never exceed one-third of the members left in the body.
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The proposition that a small group of surviving congressmen
could be considered a sufficient number to conduct business on
behalf of a 435-seat legislative body is also wrong in a more formal,
constitutional sense. A "House" consisting of the surviving ten Bay
State members would be lacking several of the basic structural
features Article I, Section 2 requires of the legislative branch.
First of all, this House would not represent the "people," as that
term is used in Article I, Section 2. One of the most basic features
of the House of Representatives, as created in that section, is that
it consists of members the American people have delegated to
represent them in their national government. 1 More than any
other part of the federal government, the House of Representatives
derives its power from what Madison termed the "great body of the
people." '252 Essential to a republican government, Madison wrote, is
"that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it. ' 253 Crucial to what
the Framers termed the "republican" nature of the House was its
proportionality, the fact that more representatives would come from
the larger states than from the smaller ones, and that "no matter
where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of every
other in electing members of Congress."2 4 Paraphrasing Madison in
Federalist No. 54, Justice Story wrote that the Convention chose
representation based on the number of people in the states because
"it had a natural and universal connexion with the rights and
liberties of the whole people." '255
The subject of a long, passionate debate in the Constitutional
Convention, this principle was ultimately embodied in Article I,
Section 2 requiring that "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union."25 The same section apportioned sixty-five House seats
for the First Congress and created a mechanism, the decennial
census and reapportionment process, that would allow the composi-
251. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
252. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 183 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
253. Id. at 182.
254. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
255. 3 STORY, supra note 44, at 239.
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment changed
this operative language to read, "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers ...." Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
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tion of the House to track that of the growing country. 27 The
Convention showed its commitment to proportional representation
by rejecting a proposal offered by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
to block new western states from ever having more seats than the
original thirteen states."' This proportionality mechanism guaran-
teed that the House of Representatives would always accurately
reflect the varying populations of the states, or in James Wilson's
famous phrase, that the House "ought to be the most exact tran-
script of the whole Society."259 In another memorable image, Wilson
explained that because he supported raising the federal pyramid to
"a considerable altitude," he "wished to give it as broad a basis as
possible" through a legislative body derived immediately from the
people, 2 0 "the legitimate source of all authority." '261
Another essential part of the so-called "Madisonian" conception
of representation was its extensive nature.2"2 Madison famously
argued, both during the Convention and in Federalist No. 10, that
one of the strengths of the proposed republican government was
that it would encompass a broad array of "Sects, Factions, &
interests," and therefore any one group would find it difficult to
build enough strength to oppress its rivals.2"3 "Extend[ing] the
sphere" and establishing a system where representatives answered
to larger, more heterogeneous groups of people, would help avoid the
257. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
258. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 2-3.
259. 1 id. at 132. A decade earlier, John Adams had explained this idea of proportional
representation:
In a large society, inhabiting an extensive country, it is impossible that the
whole should assemble, to make laws: The first necessary step then, is, to depute
power from the many, to a few of the most wise and good....
The principal difficulty lies, and the greatest care should be employed in
constituting this Representative Assembly. It should be in miniature, an exact
portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.
That it may be the interest of this Assembly to do strict justice at all times, it
should be an equal representation, or in other words equal interest among the
people should have equal interest in it.
JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government, in 4 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 87-88 (Robert J. Taylor
ed., 1979) (1776).
260. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 49.
261. Id. at 132.
262. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE To DEMOCRATIC THEORY 10-17 (1956).
263. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 135; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 45
(James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
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"factious combinations" characteristic of the smaller democracies
Madison had studied and found lacking.2" One of the fundamental
features of the legislative branch, and in particular the popularly
elected House, was its heterogeneity and its coextensiveness with
the changing boundaries of the nation. As noted in Part II, one of
the major objections to the proposed constitution was that it
excessively attenuated representation so that each House member
represented too many people to truly reflect and sympathize with
their views.26 5 Madison and Hamilton fought this "attenuated
representation" critique in many ways, most famously in Numbers
55 to 58 of the Federalist Papers. In these essays, Madison argued
that sixty-five-member apportionment, which would be regularly
augmented and adjusted through reapportionment, was a sufficient
number "for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of
diffusive sympathy, with the whole society."26
What emerges from this discussion is a clear constitutional
principle that, among other things, representation in the House of
Representatives requires a sum of legislators sufficiently numerous
and diverse to proportionally reflect the interests of the "great
body of the people."2 7 Article I, Section 2 lays out a basic standard,
one representative for every 30,000 people, and a periodic reappor-
tioning process for the House to follow over time to maintain this
principle.26 As was also discussed in Part II of this Article, the
Article I, Section 5, Clause 1 majority quorum requirement was one
of the procedural safeguards the Framers included to prevent a
small, unrepresentative minority of House members from conduct-
ing business on behalf of the entire body.26 9 This majority quorum
requirement would help assure the people that their representative
264. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). During the
Convention, Madison observed:
The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the community into
so great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st. place a majority will not
be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of
the whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in case they shd. have
such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it.
1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 136.
265. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
266. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 286 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
267. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 183 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
268. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
269. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
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body could not operate if its numbers were so low that it lost its
"diffusive sympathy" with the people of the various states.2"' A rule
allowing such a minority to conduct business directly contradicts
this majoritarian, representative principle: "There are limitations
to the House's rule-making power, and Art. I, § 2 is such a limit. 271
In light of this principle, a House consisting of ten representatives
from Massachusetts would obviously not be a constitutionally
"representative" body in the First Congress, much less the 109th
Congress.
Supporters of lower quorum requirements might concede that
rules allowing the House to operate with a number smaller than 218
would temporarily violate this collective notion of representation,
but they point out that the current rules at least preserve the
important constitutional principle of direct election of House
members.272 They argue that while small quorums might attenuate
the House's collective representation of the people, they at least
preserve the important principle that every individual who has ever
served in the House of Representatives has been elected by the
people. 7 3 In other words, the fact that the ten remaining Massachu-
setts congressmen posited in the example above were directly
elected by their constituents would give their deliberations adequate
weight and credibility to overcome the fact that they represented
less than two percent of the apportioned seats of that legislative
body.
Advocates of this position correctly argue that direct election
by the people is an important organic element of the House of
Representatives. The Framers clearly viewed the first branch of
the legislature as the most directly democratic part of the federal
government, the branch "elected immediately by the great body of
the people." '274 As Madison explained it, while the Senate and the
other branches would represent "successive filtrations" of the
people's will, the House instead would rest on the "solid foundation
270. See THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 324 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
271. Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
272. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1; see H.R. REP. No. 108-404, pt. 2, at 3 (2004).
273. See Vic Snyder, Ornstein Is Wrong: House Members Should Never Be Appointed, ROLL
CALL, Nov. 19, 2001.
274. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 183 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
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of the people themselves." '275 Frequent elections in the House of
Representatives ensured that the members of that chamber "should
have an immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate sympathy
with the people,"2 and maintained in the elected representatives'
minds the "habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people." '277
Where advocates of this popular election argument overreach,
however, is when they suggest that popular election is such a
predominating principle of congressional representation that it can
cure the absence of the other structural elements required by Article
I, Section 2. They seem to be arguing that if the first element of
Madison's maxim, that the representatives are "elected," is satisfied,
then the second part, that they represent the "great body of the
people," is merely optional. The problem with this reading is that
Article I, Section 2 lays out the basic structural requirements for the
House of Representatives-frequency of elections, qualifications,
census, and apportionment-in definitive, nonoptional terms. The
fact that a House satisfies the requirement that it be composed of
"Members chosen every second Year"278 does not then dispense with
the requirements that those members shall have the proper
qualifications and shall proportionally represent the people of the
various states. 279 A fair reading of Article I, Section 2 would be that
a legitimate House of Representatives requires all three of these
elements.
While it appears to be true that the House has never seated any
man or woman who was not elected,280 supporters of the direct
election principle probably overstate their argument when they
elevate it to the level of an inviolable democratic principle. As
discussed at the beginning of this Article, the Senate can replenish
itself through temporary appointments, 21 but Article I, Section 2
provides for vacant House seats to be filled through elections.282
While this direct election principle assuredly reflects the Framers'
275. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 50.
276. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 256 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
277. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 279 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
279. Id. cl. 3.
280. H.R. REP. NO. 109-404, pt. 2 at 3 (2004).
281. See supra note 9.
282. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4.
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keen interest in maintaining direct representation of the people in
the House, it also reflects their very practical judgment that
vacancies in a larger legislative body with frequent elections were
not likely to endanger that body's ability to do business.283 The
Senate presented a different situation than the House, Edmund
Randolph explained during the Convention, because vacancies in a
smaller body on a six-year election cycle could create "inconvenient
chasms," during which the Senate might be unable to act.2"
Randolph argued that the Senate Temporary Appointment Clause
was necessary because that chamber would "have more power &
consist of a smaller number than the other House, [and] vacancies
there w[ould] be of more consequence." '285 As Senator Cornyn pointed
out, continuity problems in the Senate could cause "inconvenient
chasms" that lasted much longer than two years.286
In other words, the evidence available from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention suggests that the Framers were not
concerned about House replenishment because they assumed that
the larger size of the House and its more frequent elections were
sufficient to address periodic vacancies. They obviously could not
have foreseen a scenario in which enemies of the United States
killed enough House members at one time to make it impossible to
muster a constitutional quorum.
283. See 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 231. James Wilson argued that the
Senate temporary replacement clause removed decision making "too far from the people," but
his amendment to remove the language failed by a vote of one to eight. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. In his famous manual of parliamentary practice, Thomas Jefferson stated that the
importance of the legislative privilege from arrest was that it protected the representative
rights of the people. He explained: "Vhen a Representative is withdrawn from his seat by
summons, the 40,000 people whom he represents lose their voice in debate and vote, as they
do on his voluntary absence; when a Senator is withdrawn by summons, his State loses half
its voice in debate and vote, as it does on his voluntary absence. The enormous disparity
of evil admits no comparison." THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY
PRAcTIcE § 290, in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, 109TH CONG. 131 (2005), available at http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_109.html. It is also worth observing that the structural differences
between the House and Senate were reduced when the Seventeenth Amendment (ratified in
1913) instituted popular elections for Senate seats. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see
also Wasserman, supra note 193, at 974-75 (noting that the Seventeenth Amendment
"instilled the same method of selection for both houses").
286. Senate Continuity Hearing, supra note 17.
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CONCLUSION
If policymakers accept this Article's argument that a House
operating with small numbers in the aftermath of a catastrophic
attack would lack the basic constitutional structure to do business,
and if they further accept the argument that the congressional rule-
making power is insufficient to remedy such a situation, what
options are left? Some observers have suggested that in such a
disaster scenario, the legislative branch would have an inherent, ex
necessitate superconstitutional power to take any necessary step
to preserve itself." ' In the case of a calamity, Professor Walter
Dellinger recently testified, the constitutional importance of having
a functioning Congress would trump all concerns about its struc-
ture."' In other words, a small, unrepresentative Congress would
be better than no Congress at all. 8 9 Relying on several inapposite
passages of the Federalist Papers discussing the federal govern-
ment's inherent power to preserve itself,2 9° Dellinger, Rules
Committee Chairman Dreier, and other observers argue that
maintaining a functioning legislative branch would justify these
drastic steps.291
The Civil War Congresses essentially took the same "ends-justify-
the-means" approach to the crisis they faced when the southern
states failed to send senators and representatives to Washington in
1861. As Part III of this Article showed, the Civil War Congresses
287. See House Continuity Hearing, supra note 193, at 32-35 (statement of Prof. Walter
Dellinger).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 34-35.
290. Specifically, a passage from Federalist No. 23, in which Hamilton refers to the "variety
of national exigencies" that require a federal government with the plenary power to raise
armies and otherwise provide for the common defense (Hamilton was the leading advocate
for the then-controversial idea of a standing army), THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 107 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003), and a passage from Federalist No. 59, in which Hamilton
is defending the "Times, Places and Manner" election provision in Article I, Section 4, a
provision addressing the federal government's relationship with state governments, THE
FEDERALIST No. 59, at 287 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). In both of these
passages, Hamilton is defending grants of power to the national government that were
controversial during the ratification debates. They do not suggest that the national
government has an additional open-ended power to preserve or defend itself, even when the
exercise of such a power clearly violates other constitutional provisions.
291. House Continuity Hearing, supra note 193, at 4-5 (statement of David Dreier,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Rules); id. at 32-35 (statement of Prof. Walter Dellinger).
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took the radical step of altering the constitutionally fixed majority
quorum rule to continue operations. Based on the language of the
majority quorum rule in Article I, Section 5, Clause 1, the debate
over quorum rules in the Constitutional Convention, and consistent
practice in the First through Thirty-sixth Congresses, the quorum
provision requires the presence of a majority of members from the
House or the Senate-as those two chambers are defined by the
Constitution and later statutes-before those chambers can do
business. During the Civil War crisis, the two chambers changed
this fixed, institution-based definition of the quorum to a variable,
member-based definition that viewed the House and Senate in
terms of the members occupying seats at any particular moment.29
The purpose of this Article has been to show that Congress does
not have an extraordinary rule-making power it can invoke when it
faces existential crises. Congress can only exercise its rule-making
powers within the boundaries that the Constitution carefully draws
around them. This Article has shown that the congressional rule-
making power does not extend to altering constitutionally fixed
rules of procedure such as the majority quorum requirement.
Furthermore, Congress can only act as a legislative body if and
when it possesses the essential structural features Article I
requires. A Congress that is not a representative body cannot make
itself one by invoking some kind of special crisis authority. The
danger of war, Jefferson argued in his Notes on the State of Virginia,
did not authorize legislators "to call that a house which was
none."
294
While the Thirty-seventh and Thirty-eighth Congresses managed
to survive the Civil War crisis, their improvised, extraconstitutional
solution to the quorum problem should not be a model for twenty-
first century disaster planning. Overextending the congressional
292. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3191-92 (1862); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess.
210 (1861).
293. See supra Part III.
294. JEFFERSON, supra note 36, at 251. See supra Part II.C for further explanation of this
passage; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 649-
50 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ('The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of
inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would
be wise, although it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were,
knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready
pretext for usurpation.").
2006] 1087
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1025
rule-making power to allow an unrepresentatively small House
and Senate to meet and do business does not solve the problem; in
fact, it creates new problems. For example, would the American
public view the actions of a small, unrepresentative Congress as
legitimate, especially if those actions involved the most solemn
congressional powers such as declaring war or selecting a Speaker
who stands in line to become president?295 And even if the general
public accepted such decisions as legitimate, would they survive the
scrutiny of the federal courts? An individual claiming injury from a
law approved by such a Congress would likely have standing in a
federal court to challenge the legitimacy of the law.296 However
these questions were resolved in a real disaster, they would create
a number of uncertainties at a moment when a "smooth, orderly,
lawful, ethical, and uncontroversial transition of power" would be of
the utmost importance.297
295. See 150 CONG. REC. H7415 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2004) (statement of Rep. Martin Frost).
296. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. Unlike a member of Congress
challenging the constitutionality of these rules before a calamity, who would lack the
necessary elements of a judicially cognizable injury, under Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997), a plaintiff injured by a law passed by a numerically small Congress, such as a
businessman injured in a way similar to the plaintiff in the Ballin case, would certainly be
able to show a particularized, concrete personal injury sufficient to meet the Article III
standing requirement. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). Professor Dellinger has
suggested that, after a calamity, federal courts might invoke the political question doctrine
to refuse to hear such injury claims because judicial decisions on these claims would
constitute "multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" in the time
of a national emergency. House Continuity Hearing, supra note 193, at 37-38 (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), and Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 252 (1993)). The
problem with this argument is that a federal court is the only appropriate department to
determine the constitutionality of a statute. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42 (1983) ("No
policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that the Congress or the Executive,
or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a
statute; that is a decision for the courts."); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199
(1880) ("[It is the province and duty of the judicial department to determine in cases regularly
brought before them, whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even those
of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the
Constitution ...."). And unlike the facts of the Nixon case, where the impeachment process is
clearly committed to a "coordinate political department," the injury case contemplated here
would require an interpretation of the relation of a constitutional clause commiting a power
to a coordinate political department (the rule-making power) to another clause limiting that
power. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
297. Akil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Essay, Is the Presidential Succession Law
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REv. 113, 136 (1995).
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The best way to avoid these uncertainties is to develop a continu-
ity plan at the constitutional level. A patchwork of statutes, rules,
and legislative practices cannot provide the authoritative guidance
our government would need to cope with the aftermath of a disaster.
As the former congressional leaders and scholars composing the
Continuity of Government Commission concluded in their 2003
report, a constitutional fix to this problem "is the only solution that
adequately addresses the problem of filling mass vacancies in
Congress quickly after a catastrophic attack.""29
Although it is not the goal of this Article to propose one constitu-
tional amendment as the definitive solution to how the legislative
branch would survive a terrorist attack, it is worth noting that both
the Continuity Commission and other policymakers have put for-
ward a number of different ideas.299 The simplest approach would
be to model a new amendment on the Seventeenth Amendment
and authorize states to appoint temporary replacements for
House members who die or are incapacitated in a mass casualty
situation."° Out of concern that these appointments not disturb the
partisan balance in Congress and represent the policy preferences
of the elected representatives they replace, a number of constitu-
tional amendment proposals would allow current members to
name their own temporary successors before or at the time of
their election.3"' While some policymakers prefer a short, concise
amendment that establishes a basic framework for temporary
replacements and then empowers Congress to work out the details
through statute,3 °2 Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise
Institute has proposed a lengthy amendment detailing the process
through which an emergency is declared and executive authorities
298. CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; see also Shayna M. Bloom, In Case
of Emergency: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment to Provide for Mass Vacancies in
the House of Representatives (Jan. 2004) (unpublished comment, on file with author).
299. See CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, app. VI; Wasserman, supra note 193,
at 967-73.
300. CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-46, 51. In the 1950s, the Senate
passed several such amendment proposals, but the House refused to take them up. Id. at 17;
see Avi Klein, Death Wish, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2006, at 19.
301. H.R.J. Res. 83, 108th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 92, 108th Cong. (2004). This proposal,
offered by Representative Brian Baird of Washington, failed in the House on a vote of 63-353
on June 2, 2004. 150 CONG. REC. H3681 (2004).
302. H.R.J. Res. 90, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 23, 108th Cong. (2003); CONTINUITY
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 51.
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in each state select temporary replacements for their House and
Senate seats. °3
Resolving to address this problem through constitutional
amendment simply requires policymakers to acknowledge that the
mechanics of the legislative branch the Framers created in 1787
need to be adjusted to the realities of the twenty-first century.
Article I dealt with the vacancy and replenishment problems its
eighteenth-century authors could foresee. They cannot be blamed
for failing to foresee that two centuries later, America's enemies
might be capable of simultaneously killing or incapacitating large
numbers of federal legislators. Although some members of Congress
are squeamish about amending the Constitution, they should recall
that on several occasions in our history, Congress and the States
have amended the Constitution to resolve problems of constitutional
mechanics. After the controversial presidential election of 1800,
Congress and the States ratified the Twelfth Amendment to clarify
the presidential selection process. They ratified the Twentieth
Amendment in the 1930s to move up the presidential inauguration
date to January 20, to clarify presidential succession, and to shorten
postelection 'lame duck" sessions of Congress. In the wake of the
Kennedy assassination, they ratified the Twenty-fifth Amendment
to clarify the rules of presidential succession and address the
issue of temporary presidential incapacity. As their predecessors did
in these three instances, today's lawmakers should forthrightly
acknowledge that the constitutional mechanics of congressional
continuity need to be updated. Congress should fix these shortcom-
ings while they are still theoretical questions in a disaster planning
exercise, rather than wait until they are exposed by actual catastro-
phes.
303. CONTINUITY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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